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Abstract
The research on home and community care shows that when safely delivered it can be an
efficient way to support elders who require care, potentially preventing a move into costlier
institutional care. Learning from system-wide safety breakdowns that occur is necessary to
establish appropriate prevention strategies. The purpose of this study was to identify the
factors that contributed to adverse events in care-dependent community-dwelling older adults
and their caregivers. Using a multiple case study methodology, eight falls were investigated
using a comprehensive Systemic Falls Investigative Method. Using within case and across
case analyses, a total of 280 contributing factors were identified, and grouped in four distinct
themes of safety deficiencies: Everyday living has become risky, Limitations with
supervision, Disconnects within the system, and Poor fall risk identification and follow-up.
This study provides insights into how and why adverse events occur in home and community
care, allowing for targeted systemic improvements.

Keywords
Older adults, seniors, adults 80+, community care, systems theory, health-related safety,
adverse events, falls, case study research, SFIM.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Many older adults wish to “age in place”, referring to the desire to remain in one’s own
home, surrounded by familiar belongings and familiar routines, as functional abilities decline
during the aging process. Helping older adults age in place safely is beneficial to the
healthcare system as well. On average, institutional care is costlier than home care (Miller,
Hollander, & MacAdam, 2008). Many older adults are able to live on their own. Over half of
elders over 85 years of age still live independently, with only 33.2% of elders over 85 years
of age residing in long term care (LTC); 88% of adults who are between 65-75years of age
are independent with activities of daily living (ADLs); this decreases to 41% for those over
85 years of age (Institute for Life Course and Aging, 2007). The rapidly increasing
demographic group of individuals over 65 years of age and especially the fastest growing
group of those over 80 years (Statistics Canada, 2010), will translate into increased numbers
of people requiring care and support as they age (Turcotte & Schellenberg, 2006). Within the
home and community environment, this care assistance can come from family and friends,
formal home care agencies, or not-for-profit organizations. Assistance within the home
provides support to individuals who require help with daily functional tasks, such as
dressing, bathing and meal preparation, or to those individuals who need professional health
care for recovery after an illness or a hospital stay. Care within the home can also support
those who require help for maintenance of current functional abilities or for slowing down
the functional decline related to chronic degenerative conditions.
Most individuals will age in place safely, but adverse events (AEs) can occur. Healthrelated safety in the home and community is defined “as the minimization of the probability
of preventable, unintended harm in community-dwelling individuals. Health-related safety
aims to understand how and why adverse health events occur and to identify what
breakdowns in the societal system expose individuals to hazards” (Lau, Scandrett,
Jarzebowski, Holman, & Emanual, 2007, pp. 840-841). These preventable events can
threaten an individual’s ability to age in place successfully and without harm.
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Although patient safety within hospitals has been addressed in a variety of ways,
individuals being cared for in the community have been included but not specifically
addressed in the patient safety discussions. This is changing, as demonstrated by the
Canadian Patient Safety Institute’s report Safety in home care: Broadening the patient safety
agenda to include home care services (Lang & Edwards, 2006). As home based care delves
into patient safety, it will be important to keep systemic and human factors in the forefront.
Older adults aging in place are supported by many different people and outside agencies,
often with their own distinct guiding policies and procedures, or, in the case of informal
caregivers, no formal guidelines. Each person brings a mix of his or her own abilities and
weaknesses, areas of experience and inexperience, biases and habits, in short— the human
factors.
Preventing AEs will involve taking a close look at all the issues that link together to
culminate in an undesirable event. Incidents and accidents are never the result of a single
factor (Reason, 1990). Identification of the combination of factors that contributed to the AE
may lead to an understanding of systemic problems and may allow for more targeted
prevention of unnecessary harm. Targeted prevention has the potential to increase the safety
and well-being of many community dwelling older adults and their caregivers, allowing for
successful ageing in place, and reducing unnecessary healthcare expenditures. This thesis
utilizes a systemic investigation method to take a closer look at the factors that contributed to
AEs and to report findings that will guide future improvements of safety for community
dwelling older persons aging in place.

1.1 Literature Review
1.1.1 Care Within the Home
Staying home with an increased level of support is preferred by older adults over the
alternative of moving into a long term care (LTC) facility (Carstairs & Keon, 2009). The
need for increased support is not inevitable as one becomes older, but the percentage who
require help with activities of daily living (ADLs) increases as these individuals become
older and potentially frailer (Kart & Kinney, 2001; Smith, 2001). Supports for those desiring
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to age in place can come from formal homecare agencies (providers), family and friends
(informal caregivers), and not-for-profit agencies.

1.1.1.1

Formal Homecare

Formal Homecare services (which will be Homecare with a capital for the purposes of this
thesis) offer supports that allow an individual to remain living in the community and prevent
admission to a LTC. Homecare services are designed to supplement the care older adults are
able to provide for themselves or to supplement the assistance provided by family and
friends. Homecare programs and services offered in each region throughout Canada are not
standardized, but generally services include nursing care, services from allied health
professionals (most often dieticians, occupational therapists, physical therapists, and social
workers), and non-medical home support services. The non-medical home support services
are usually provided by personal support workers (PSWs). PSWs can be assigned to assist
with activities of daily living (ADLs), such as bathing, dressing, grooming, toileting, and
transfers, and a few instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), such as basic home
cleaning, meal preparation, and laundry. The provision of equipment such as hospital beds,
commodes, and transfers aids is often funded on a short term basis. The amount and type of
non-medical home support services funded by the provincial government and eligibility
requirements vary throughout Canada and within each province. For example, in
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec the cost of Homecare services are not to exceed the
cost of LTC (Canadian Home Care Association, 2008). In Ontario, Prince Edward Island and
Nova Scotia’s acute care program, guidelines are in place predefining the amount of dollars
or the number of hours allowed per individual. In British Columbia, Nunavut, and the North
West Territories there is no established maximum limit.
Most Homecare services within Ontario are delivered by agencies contracted to a
local Community Care Access Centre (CCAC), some of which are for profit agencies, and
others of which are not-for-profit agencies. Each agency is required to follow the
requirements and regulations set out by the region’s CCAC. The CCAC is overseen by a
Local Health Integration Network (LHIN), which receives funding from the provincial
Ministry of Health. The LHIN provides a budgeted amount of money to the CCAC each year
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and gives guidance for how the money is expected to be spent. The CCAC assigns a case
manager to each client on the Homecare program, and the case manager determines which
type and the frequency of services the client will receive based on the Resident Assessment
Instrument for Home Care (RAI-HC). The RAI-HC is a standardized assessment tool that is
completed face to face with clients, within six weeks of admission to the program. The tool
has domains related to function, health, social support, and service. All case managers
receive standardized training on this tool and use the results of the RAI-HC to inform and
guide the planning of the amount of home services to be contracted from outside agencies.
Case managers are directly employed by CCAC.
The importance of home based care within the healthcare system has become
increasingly evident as healthcare costs increase. In 1996 healthcare expenditures per capita
was just over $2 500; in 2010 this had increased to $5 659 per capita (Canadian Institute for
Health Information (CIHI), 2012; Ontario Health Quality Council (OHQC), 2010). Even with
a constant dollar rate to account for inflation, the comparable cost per capita in 2012 was
over $4 000. According to the CIHI’s online cost estimator (http://www.cihi.ca/cihi-extportal/internet/en/applicationnew/spending+and+health+workforce/spending/cihi020209),
the average cost for a patient who is in the hospital and awaiting placement into LTC was $8
499 . The average cost for one day in an Ontario hospital was $842 (in 2011,) and it was
estimated that 16% of hospital beds are occupied by individuals requiring an alternate level
of care (i.e., LTC) (Ontario Home Care Association, 2011). Frequently it is the need for nonmedical services that prompts the move of these individuals to LTC (Chen & Thompson,
2010; Williams et al., 2009). It may be possible to meet the same level of care within the
home environment, with the appropriate amount of Homecare (Ontario Health Quality
Council, 2010; Williams et al., 2009).
Supporting individuals at home is to the advantage of the healthcare system., Miller
and her colleagues reported that on average the cost of provincially funded Homecare was six
times less than the cost of LTC, which is supplemented by the province ($9 104/person/year
versus $65 175/person/year) (Miller et al., 2008). Even when the (minimum) wage
replacement for informal caregiving and other expenses to the family were taken into
account, the comparable cost was $37 008/person/year for community care and $87
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376/person/year for facility care. Utilizing Homecare services to replace alternate levels of
care in the hospital and LTC has the potential to save the Ontario healthcare system $150
million each year (VanderBent & Kutcha, 2010). However, although the cost efficiency of
Homecare for the healthcare system is evident, it also should be kept in mind that the lower
cost of Homecare is partially based on the support provided by informal, unpaid caregivers.

1.1.1.2

Informal Caregivers

The support of informal caregivers is essential for older adults to remain in their home
successfully in advanced old age. According to the CIHI (2010) only 2% of those receiving
Homecare manage without any additional informal care. Non-medical home support services
provided through the Ontario Ministry of Health are usually not sufficient to meet all of the
needs of an older adult who wishes to age in place. Moreover, an individual’s specific care
needs may not qualify for government covered services. In those situations it takes the efforts
of unpaid, informal caregivers, such as spouses, children, grandchildren, siblings, other
family members, friends, and neighbours to fully support the person and prevent
institutionalization (Miller et al., 2008). An estimated 80% of assisted support within the
home is provided by unpaid caregivers (CIHI, 2010), who often do not have previous
experience in healthcare (Lang, Edwards, & Fleiszer, 2008; MacDonald & Storch, 2010).
Caregiving often begins with small IADL related tasks, and gradually grows. The
role is often assumed due to love, marriage, family ties, friendship, or out of a feeling of
obligation, when there is no one else to provide assistance (Dow & McDonald, 2007;
MacDonald & Storch, 2010). Many caregivers are unaware of the future requirements of
such a role and the potential for slow, exponential growth of their responsibilities
(MacDonald & Storch, 2010). Over time this can create stress related decrease in the
caregiver’s health, increased risk of depression, and increased physical pain (CIHI, 2010;
Dow & McDonald, 2007; MacDonald & Storch, 2010; Ranmuthugala, Nepal, Brown, &
Percival, 2009), especially if caregiver’s capabilities and limitations are not taken into
consideration (Henriksen, Joseph, & Zayas-Caba, 2009; National Research Council, 2011).
In Miller et al.’s (2008) study, 53% of the caregivers for veterans were over the age of 65,
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and 40% were over the age of 70. It is also vital, therefore, to take caregivers’ limitations into
account because older caregivers often have health issues and care needs of their own.
Caregivers are essential for help in and around an elder’s home. They provide
assistance with grass cutting, snow shoveling, and grocery shopping, as well as personal care
such as bathing, dressing, transfers, and medication management. Informal caregivers also
provide emotional support, monitor the needs of the care recipient, and coordinate the formal,
paid care providers within the home (Williams et al., 2009). According to CIHI, caregivers in
Canada provide an average of 18.4 hours of care each week (CIHI, 2010). The estimated
market value of informal caregiving for adults over the age of 65 years is $25-26 billion per
year within the province of Ontario alone (Miller et al., 2008). Caregivers play an important
role in the success of care within the home, allowing older adults to remain in the community
and reducing healthcare system costs.

1.1.1.3

Not-for-Profit Agencies

Not-for-profit agencies provide services that enable older adults and their caregivers to
continue with care in the home. The agencies often rely on volunteers and include programs
such as meals on wheels, friendly visitor programs, transportation to medical appointments,
care giver support groups, day programs, and library book exchange. Program fees are kept
to a minimum to allow for increased accessibility and are often subsidized by government
grants, fund raising, and public donations. The Alzheimer Society, Red Cross, and Victorian
Order of Nurses (VON) are some examples of not-for-profit agencies that provide
programming to assist older adults with aging in place.

1.1.2 Safety of Care-Dependent Older Adults in the Home and
Community
Harmful incidents or adverse events increase the use of healthcare resources and increase
costs to the healthcare system as a whole. Beyond healthcare dollar utilization, AEs have
personal consequences to the health, well-being, and life potential of those experiencing the
AE (Smartrisk, 2009). The term “adverse event” has been defined within healthcare safety
literature in different ways, as described in Appendix A. For the purpose of this study an
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adverse event (AE) is defined as ‘an unintentional event that could have resulted, or did
result, in unnecessary preventable harm’. The prevention of these events, whether harmful or
not, is in the best interest of the healthcare system and older adults.
Baker et al. (2004) produced one of the first reports with AE rates within the
Canadian healthcare system. He examined the rates of AEs within hospitals, finding an AE
rate of 7.5%. Lang and Edwards (2006) proposed expanding the studies of patient safety to
include home care. The authors identified 10 themes that describe differences between safety
in hospital care and home based care: 1) family is the unit of care; 2) safety of the client,
family, caregivers, and providers is linked; 3) the setting of individual homes is unregulated
and uncontrolled; 4) there are multiple dimensions of safety within the home setting
(physical, emotional, social, and functional); 5) the role of autonomy and choice for clients,
families, and caregivers; 6) isolation is a factor for clients as well as families and caregivers;
7) communication breakdowns between provider and client as well as between providers; 8)
the maintenance and development of knowledge, skill, and competence for providers; 9) the
changing focus of home care services from prevention, health promotion, and chronic care to
more acute service provision; and 10) the human resource challenges. Addressing safety
within home care is more complex than it is within hospitals.
In 2006, Lang and Edwards (2006) stated “there is an urgent need for research on
safety in home care” (p. 27). Consecutive studies have moved onto examining safety and
prevalence of AEs within the formal home care system (Doran et al., 2009; Johnson, 2006;
Madigan, 2007; Masotti, Green, Shortt, Hunter, & Szala-Meneoak, 2007; Sears, 2008).
Appendix B contains a comparative table of one hospital and five home care studies that
examined prevalence of AEs in health care. Reported AE rates varied from 5.5% to 13.2%.
The variation was most likely due to the different inclusion/exclusion criteria for the case
files reviewed and the inclusion/exclusion criteria of the AE categories used. Both Johnson
(2006) and Sears (2008) reported that almost 30% of the events examined in their studies
were preventable (26.9% and 32.7% respectively). Of the AEs identified in the Canadian
studies, the most prevalent were related to falls (24.6%-61%) and medications (16.4%-23.1
%). Doran et al. (2009) found that 11% of the 238 958 cases reviewed had experienced a new
fall; that is 26 285 falls.
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Falls can occur at any time of life, but the risk of injury after a fall was nine times
greater when a person was over the age of 65 years (Smartrisk, 2009). Peel (2011) reviewed
15 studies examining falls in older community dwelling adults and found that the prevalence
rates for participants who had a fall in the past year varied from 19.3% up to 60%, where the
oldest old had the highest rates. The accumulated effects of aging and co-morbidities
(intrinsic factors) increase an older adult’s susceptibility to environmental (extrinsic) factors.
Consequences of falls cost the Canadian healthcare system $2 billion dollars in direct care
costs in 2004 (Smartrisk, 2009).
Inappropriate medications and medication mismanagement are costly, leading to a
1.5-2 times increased risk of a greater number of physician and emergency room (ER) visits
(Fick, Mion, Beers, & Waller, 2008). Adverse drug reactions account for 4% of hospital bed
capacities, with an eight day hospital stay on average (Pirmohamed et al., 2004). Over 35%
of those over the age of 60 are taking more than five medications, with polypharmacy leading
to increased adverse drug reactions that result in falls, declined functional capacity, and
decreased cognition (Geller, Nopkhun, Dows-Martinez, & Strassor, 2012).
Decreasing AEs would have many benefits for the healthcare system and for those
who experience them. Preventing these events requires identification of the factors that
contributed to the incident.

1.1.3 Contributing Factors to Adverse Events
A better understanding of the factors that contribute to AEs is needed to improve safety and
decrease the chances of a harmful incident occurring to care recipients or their caregivers
(Doran et al., 2009; Masotti, McColl, & Green, 2010; Sears, 2008). Older adults, and those
that care for them, are a heterogeneous group of individuals with varying skills, knowledge
levels, abilities, and disabilities. Due to normal aging process all older adults experience
some degree of decreased strength, decreased balance, decreased endurance, and decreased
vision (Cox, 2006). This affects how they are able to manage caring for themselves and their
ability to manage carrying out instructions given to them from healthcare providers, such as
the doctor and nurse. In addition, each home environment is different, potentially enabling or
hindering the completion of daily tasks. Caregivers and care providers comes into the older
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adult’s home with their own experiences and areas of expertise, as well as gaps in expertise.
If care demands “exceed a person’s capabilities, the safety, efficacy and efficiency of that
care will suffer” (National Research Council, 2011, p. 1). Due to the multiple players
involved, human capabilities and limitations—also known as the human factors, are another
of the multiple factors affecting safety for care-dependent individuals who are aging in place
and their formal and informal caregivers.
Research on safety in the Homecare system has attributed AEs to multiple
contributing factors. Johnson (2006) found that 30.8% of the AEs were client related, 42.3 %
were caregiver related, 50% were associated with case manager issues such as not
introducing services in a timely manner, and 4.3 % were physician related. Sears (2008)
found that 29.5% of AEs were related to home care workers, 27.9% involved caregivers, and
52.6% events involved the care receiver (self-care). Sears reported that the majority of AE
related deaths reported in her study were related to the actions of the care recipient and
caregiver. The participants in Masotti et al.’s 2007 study identified a number of factors that
may contribute to the occurrence of AEs. Factors such as communication problems, clients
with complex needs, insufficient training, inappropriate home environments, delays in
service, moving care responsibility to clients and caregivers, failure to identify and control
for risks, use and misuse of equipment, and insufficient human and financial resources. The
work of Masotti and colleagues (2007) moved the focus from the individuals at “fault” to
broader systemic issues.
In a more recent study, Masotti et al. (2010) identified patient-level as well as
organizational and system-level characteristics associated with causes and increased risk for
AEs. Patient-level causes included increased age and co-morbidities, gender,
depression/cognitive impairment/functional status limitations, patient compliance, and living
alone or not having a caregiver. Organizational and system-level characteristics included
communication issues and collaboration, team experience, team workload, medication errors,
unrecognized polypharmacy, drug label instructions, inadequate patient monitoring, and
assessment. Authors concluded that preventing or reducing AEs would require targeted multilevel changes and further research. One area of future research suggested was to examine the
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“multi-level variables associated with the occurrence of adverse events (e.g.
patient/provider/system-level variables associated with causes and consequences)” (p. 121).
The majority of research studies identified contributing factors based on retrospective
chart reviews and opinions of home healthcare experts. These methods are insufficient to
provide a full, thorough investigation of contributing factors due to hindsight bias, which
affects how a situation is viewed after the fact when an outcome is known. This bias causes
people to overestimate what they knew before an incident and to overestimate what others
may have known beforehand (Woods & Cook, 1999). Without a thorough investigation
method that acknowledges hindsight bias, investigators and researchers completing case
chart reviews run the risk of believing that the individuals directly involved at the time of the
incident knew more than they actually did or were aware of more about their situation than
they actually were. To ensure there is comprehensive identification of the contributing factors
that linked together and affected one another to result in the AE, a thorough reflective
investigation that involves interviewing the individuals affected and the others involved is
necessary.

1.2 Systems Approach to Investigation of Adverse Events
A system is a set of interdependent elements interacting to achieve a common goal (Institute
of Medicine (IOM), 1999). The elements of a societal system may be human or non-human,
consisting of people, places, and institutions. It is important to realize that a person does not
age in place without context. To understand how AEs occur and what factors contributed, it
is essential to use a systems approach and create an understanding of the societal system
surrounding a community dwelling person and how factors within each component of the
system affect the other components. The sharp-end factors of an AE describe active failures
related to the individuals directly involved in the incident. Blunt-end factors of an AE
describe latent system-wide factors, removed from the direct control of the individuals
immediately involved in the incident. The actions of an individual (sharp-end factors) are the
result of multiple factors within each component of the system (blunt-end factors) that have
intertwined to create a situation that may or may not result in harm. Though unsafe actions
can be seen as a result of human error (Miyagi, 2005), human error needs to be treated as a
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consequence of system vulnerabilities and not the cause (Henriksen, Dayton, Keyes,
Carayon, & Hughes, 2008).
If an investigation of an event is conducted and only the immediate sharp-end factors
are identified, the latent underlying systemic causes will be missed and ignored. In ignoring
the underlying causes, the chance to ameliorate the situation from reoccurring in the future is
lost, and the latent danger remains (Miyagi, 2005; Reason, 1990; Woods & Cook, 1999).
Focusing on improving safety culture does not deal with poor design of the system. This may
lead to downplaying the importance of designing a system that makes it easy to do the right
thing and harder to do the wrong thing, putting the responsibility for error avoidance back
onto individuals operating within the system (Rollenhagen, 2010). Individuals do play a role,
but individuals are living and functioning within a larger system that calls for them to act in
one way or another.
Insight is needed to uncover and understand the options an individual had when
performing an unsafe act that led to an AE. Humans will make errors (Ayeko, 2002; IOM,
1999), but it is possible to minimize the prevalence and consequences of those incidents, with
an understanding of the unsafe conditions that combined with unsafe acts at the time of the
event (Ayeko, 2002; IOM, 1999; Leape, 2004; Zecevic, Salmoni, Lewko, & Vandervoort,
2007). Recognizing and understanding how the system and its policies combine with the
actions of the multiple players who operate within it can have a positive influence on the
safety of older adults requiring support (Henriksen et al., 2008). To gain this recognition and
understanding, use of an investigation method is needed that identifies and examines how
multiple contributing factors within various levels of the system combine to result in an AE.

1.3 Systemic Investigation Method
A systemic investigation method is required to gain that deeper understanding of how to
optimize safety for those aging in place. The Systemic Falls Investigation Method (SFIM) is
one such tool. The SFIM is a six step method designed specifically to examine the factors
that contribute to falls in seniors (Zecevic et al., 2007; Zecevic, Salmoni, Lewko,
Vandervoort, & Speechley, 2009). It is based on the Integrated Safety Investigation
Methodology (ISIM) used by the Canadian Transportation Safety Board to investigate
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accidents in aviation. Detailed description of SFIM method is available elsewhere (Zecevic et
al. 2007) and a summary is provided in the Methods section of this thesis. Only a brief
description of its six steps is presented here.
Step one of SFIM involves collecting data using FSHEL tool based on five
categories: the individual who fell, the software (e.g., policies and procedures), the hardware
(e.g., equipment), the liveware (e.g., care providers, caregivers, social networks), and the
environment (e.g., natural and physical). Step two is to develop a sequence of events and to
identify the safety significant events. Step three consists of examining the safety significant
events and connecting unsafe conditions with unsafe acts or unsafe decisions. The fourth step
is to situate the identified contributing factors within one of four levels of the Swiss Cheese
Model of Accident Causation: unsafe acts and decisions, preconditions, supervision and
organizational issues. In step five the investigator summarizes all contributing factors to
identify the safety deficiencies. The final step, six, is to assign priorities and develop a safety
action. The design of the SFIM allows for a comprehensive investigation, examining system
and human factors that contribute to an incident. The tool has been used to investigate falls in
community (Zecevic et al., 2009), acute care and rehabilitation hospitals, assistive living and
long term care facilities (Madady, Zecevic, Salmoni & Young, 2013; Zecevic et al., 2010;
Zecevic, Li, Davy, Halligan, & Kothari, 2010). Although it was designed with falls in mind,
the SFIM has the potential to investigate any type of AE in health care.

1.4 Summary
Older adults will require more health care and more support to safely stay in their own homes
and age in place. With the baby boomer generation beginning to turn 65 years of age, the
numbers of people requiring care in the home will increase. An intricate system, with
multiple players, surrounds the care-dependent older adult and their caregivers. When these
interlinked systemic components interact well, AEs are minimized. When this complex
system does not interact well, unnecessary harm can result. Falls as AEs can result in
decreased quality of life and injuries that create additional costs to the healthcare system;
they are caused by variety of factors and increase in prevalence with advanced age.
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Understanding the factors that contribute to falls will help with targeting appropriate
interventions, to keep the home and community safe for older adults and their caregivers.

1.5 Purpose
The purpose of this study was to identify the factors that contributed to AEs, falls in
particular, in care-dependent community-dwelling older adults and their caregivers. Specific
objectives were to:
•

Conduct case studies using the SFIM to identify specific safety deficiencies at the
four levels of Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation that contributed to the fall
events.

•

Provide evidence on how the system-wide latent factors combine with the actions of
people at the sharp end to cause AEs in care-dependent community dwelling older
adults and their caregivers.

•

Identify the themes from patterns and similarities across multiple case studies.

•

Discuss the implications of safety breakdowns and direction for their improvements.

1.6 Positioning the Researcher
This study focus is of personal interest. I have been employed as an occupational therapist
and worked as a provider in the formal homecare sector for over 15 years, assisting
individuals with problem solving to find solutions that allow safe continued occupational
participation within the home environment. As eligibility for government funded service
changed, I saw individuals and families who were struggling when their PSW support hours
were decreased or when specific services were declined. At the same time the clients on my
caseload were getting older, frailer, and more acute, and I became interested in the ways
society could best support older adults to safely age in place. By studying the factors that
contribute to AEs, I hoped to learn how systemic factors connected with individual factors to
restrict safe occupational performance and result in an AE. Through this study I hope to
enlighten others about the roles we all play in keeping older adults safe and how choices at
one societal level have consequences on other levels.
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Chapter 2

2

Methods
2.1 Philosophical Anchor

My research position is that of interpretivism. I agree with Finlay (2006) that perceptions and
past experiences affected how the data collected was interpreted. I have subtle realism
ontology. As a subtle realist, I believe that a reality does exist, but I am aware that this reality
can be affected by subjectivity of the researcher and the participants. I acknowledge that a
perfect representation of reality is hard to obtain (Finlay, 2006; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). As
such, in order to represent reality as closely as possible in my interpretations of the data, I, as
the researcher, looked for external verification from the participants, research literature, and
researcher collaborators when interpreting data to ensure the results were trustworthy and
authentic.

2.2 Methodology
To ameliorate AEs and improve safety of older adults, it is important to understand how
various factors at multiple levels of the system linked together. Reason (1990) discussed that
a case study methodology can provide valuable information about causal factors and their
interactions. A collective case study research approach was selected for this project because
case study methodology allows for an in depth analysis of complex real-life situations
(Creswell, 2013; French, Reynolds, & Swain, 2001; Stake, 2005). “The real value of case
study lies in the particularity of individual experience that may provide useful examples for
larger numbers of people.” (Salminen, Harra, & Lautamo, 2006, p. 7). When using a case
study design, the researcher completes an intensive investigation of a situation and examines
the various factors that brought about the specific outcome. In this study, the outcome is the
fall. This comprehensive investigation provides the basis for in-depth detailed documentation
of the case, allowing for “naturalistic generalization”. Naturalistic generalization refers to
generalization for others who are able to recognize their own experiences in the case (Stake,
2005). A case study can also “be a disciplined force in setting public policy and reflecting on
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human experience. Vicarious experience is an important basis for refining action options and
expectations.” (Stake, 2005, p. 460). It is hoped that the results of this research will influence
public policies and allow others to reflect on the complexities that contribute to the unsafe
situations surrounding older adults. It is important to note that case study research is different
from case examples or case reports, which are primarily used for professional education
(Salminen et al., 2006). Case study research is intensive and time consuming. Data are
collected from multiple sources and in multiple ways to ensure that the complexities of the
case are captured.
The methods and procedures utilized here were consistent with qualitative methodology
and case study research. The researcher independently completed all investigations in the
field, utilized multiple data sources, and sought external verification throughout the study. In
an attempt to ensure trustworthiness, during the course of the study the author completed
reflective journaling and conducted reflective discussions with the supervisor and members
of advisory committee. Subjective reflection, as described by Finlay (2002), throughout the
research process allowed for an increased understanding of how the information gathered
was interpreted based on the personal reactions of the researcher.

2.3 Procedure
2.3.1 Setting and Recruitment
The focus of the study was on community dwelling seniors aging in place, and therefore the
study was completed in a community setting. In January 2011 the researcher approached the
East Elgin Family Health Team (EEFHT) to collaborate on this research project. The EEFHT
readily agreed to participate and assist with participant recruitment. One family physician
and one nurse practitioner from this team were the main contacts. The EEFHT is located in
eastern Elgin County and serves the town of Aylmer and townships of Bayham and
Malahide, with approximately 25,000 mostly rural residents. The EEFHT is a primary health
care team of five family physicians, three nurse practitioners, and one social worker. The
team has been serving the community since 2005. Partnering with EEFHT allowed for
recruitment of older adults who were Homecare recipients as well as older adults who were
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not receiving their care from Homecare. Ethics approval was received from the University of
Western Ontario (Appendix C).

2.3.2 Participants
2.3.2.1

Primary Participants

The primary participants were fallers who were recruited directly by the EEFHT. Purposeful
sampling was used, choosing cases that offered the greatest opportunity for learning.
Investigating falls in older adults who received care or provided care allowed for the
examination of the more vulnerable individuals, with more complex situations contributing to
the AE. The inclusion criteria were: an individual over the age of 65 years, who had
experienced a fall in the past 30 days. The participants were selected if they required
assistance to remain living in the community or were the provider of such assistance (e.g.,
caregiver).
Individuals were excluded if they did not speak English or were not willing to sign
the written consent form. Participants also could not be the researcher’s current clients for
occupational therapy services. For participants with cognitive impairments ascertained by a
MMSE score lower than 21, consent was sought from the legally authorized substitute
decision maker.

2.3.2.2

Secondary Participants

A second group of participants were identified during the case investigations and were
recruited by the researcher. These participants were individuals who were able to provide
relevant information about the occurrence of the fall or the factors that contributed to the
event. Data collection from multiple sources allowed for triangulation of data. Secondary
participants included witnesses and others with information about the event, the primary
participant, the environment, or the organizational factors. The secondary participants
included other family members and formal caregivers, doctors, nurses, therapists,
Community Care Access Centres (CCAC) case managers, and friends, as well as others with
specialized knowledge about contributing factors and circumstances related to the
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contributing factors. Only secondary participants who gave informed consent for the
researcher to use their comments were included in the study. Some secondary participants
were identified by the primary participants; other potential information sources were
identified in discussion with the tertiary workgroup participants.

2.3.2.3

Tertiary Workgroup Participants

As case studies were developed, they were reviewed and discussed with up to four members
of a SFIM workgroup as well. All members of the workgroup completed a two day training
session on SFIM and conducted investigations in other research projects. In addition to the
researcher, the workgroup members were: the SFIM creator, who had six years of experience
with SFIM investigations; an experienced physical therapist and a doctoral candidate in the
health and rehabilitation program; a second year masters student working on a project related
to falls occurring in stroke survivors; and a second year kinesiology masters student
interested in patient safety and diverse systemic investigation methods.

2.3.3 Data Collection
The Systemic Falls Investigation Method (SFIM) was chosen as the data collection tool.
Previous studies have demonstrated that it is an effective method for identification of systemwide contributing factors to falls that occur in a community setting with an older adult
population. In October of 2011, the researcher attended a two day workshop on how to utilize
the SFIM and use the web-based SFIM Database. The workshop was taught by Dr. A.
Zecevic, the original author of the SFIM (Zecevic et al., 2007).
In January 2012, the researcher attended a staff meeting at the EEFHT and explained
to the staff members the purpose of the study, study protocol, and participant recruitment
process. Identification of eligible participants and a suggested script for participant
recruitment was shared with staff (Appendix D). Envelopes containing a letter of information
and consent form (Appendix E) were provided to staff to deliver to the potential participants.
From late January 2012 to early June 2012 EEFHT physicians and nurse practitioners
approached eligible individuals with an invitation to participate in the study. When an
individual agreed, the recruiter ensured that the potential participant obtained a letter of
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information and completed the contact information form (Appendix F). The EEFHT then
contacted the researcher by telephone to pick up the contact information form. Once the
researcher had the contact information, the researcher telephoned the primary participant to
arrange for an initial interview. All interviews were completed within two days of receiving
the contact information.
The first interview involved the primary participant and his/her caregiver. In the
situation where the primary participant was a caregiver, the care receiver was also involved
in the interview. The interview started with reviewing the letter of information, answering
any questions and obtaining consent. Once consent was received, the Mini Mental State
Exam (MMSE) (Appendix G) was completed (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). The
MMSE is a cognitive screening tool that can check for potential cognitive impairment and is
used in the context of SFIM data collection to establish credibility of facts provided by the
faller. One participant did not complete the MMSE. This participant went to hospital after
the fall where she experienced confusion that was not evident prior to the fall. She described
minor difficulties with learning new tasks and had her daughter provide most of the
information for the investigation. For the purpose of this study, her cognitive status was
labeled as mild cognitive impairment. When the MMSE score was less than 21, all data
obtained from the faller had to be triangulated and confirmed with at least two alternate
information sources. Only one participant had a score lower than 21 and the above mentioned
protocol was followed. After the cognitive screen, the SFIM investigation process
commenced.

2.3.3.1

Systemic Falls Investigation Method Process

A brief overview of the SFIM was given in chapter one. This section provides further details
and examples to allow for study replication. Though separated into six steps, the first two
components were a cyclical process, with continual researcher reflexivity and member
checking with participants to ensure triangulation and credibility of the data collected, and to
produce a summary of the event.
Step one: Completion of a semi-structured interview at the home of the faller
(interview template, Appendix H). An interview was conducted with the faller and his/her
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caregiver, or care recipient if the event occurred with the caregiver. The objective of the
interview was to collect data using the F-SHEL framework:
•

F—facts about the faller; includes their physical, physiological, psychological
and psychosocial characteristics

•

S—software; includes training, policies and procedures, manuals, and/or
checklists that were in place, either for the care procedures of the faller or for
any equipment that was in use

•

H—hardware; includes equipment used, mobility aids, transfer aids, bath aids,
layout of items, display screens, footwear used by individuals involved at the
time of the fall

•

E—faller’s environment; includes internal conditions such as lighting,
temperature, noise, floor conditions and external environment such as
weather, community conditions/particularities

•

L—liveware surrounding the faller; includes the other people involved,
witnesses, healthcare providers and agencies, other family members, peoples’
attitudes, social networks, communication

All interviews were audio recorded. In addition photos were taken of the home environment,
aids used at the time, and location of the fall. Recreation of the event occurred in this initial
interview. The initial interviews with the primary participants provided information for steps
two and three and on average took 45 minutes to an hour and a half to complete.
Step one also involved a review of medications, review of health records, and on-line
searches for additional details such as building codes. Any secondary participants identified
at the time of the initial interview were contacted, had the nature of the study explained to
them, verbally or by email, and asked if they wished to participate in the study. When
secondary participants agreed to an interview, he/she was presented with a letter of
information and asked to sign a consent form (Appendix I). Interviews with secondary
participants took on average 10 minutes to an hour (interview template, appendix J). Each of
these processes took half an hour to an hour to complete.
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Step two: Develop the sequence of events that led up to the event. This step was initiated
by the researcher after the initial interview and involved developing a chronological
hypothesis of the sequence of events that led to the fall. The sequence of events was then
revised and confirmed through additional data collection and the events that were safetysignificant were identified. Safety significant events (SSEs) were acts and decisions that
directly contributed to the AE. An SSE was determined by answering the following
questions about each event in the sequence:
•

Was this task undesirable?

•

Was this task non-standard?

•

Was this task linked or potentially linked to another undesirable event?

•

Was this task one of alternative actions or options available?

If the answer was ‘yes’ to any of the questions, the act was classified as an SSE. Each SSE
was then examined more closely by asking further questions regarding the “why”. For
example: Why was this task undesirable? Why was this task completed in a non-standard
format? Why did the individual choose to complete this action over another one? The “why”
questions uncovered further need for data collection and led to interviews with additionally
identified secondary participants, further observations, or further review of additional data
sources, such as written materials on policies or medical records.
At this point the sequence of events and identified SSEs were reviewed with
workgroup participants to discuss potential gaps in the sequence of events and to determine
what further data were required to answer the “why” questions. Follow up interviews were
completed at the participant’s home, place of work, over the telephone, or by email,
depending on the information required and the preference of the participant. All of the
interviews and follow-ups occurred within four weeks from the first contact with the faller.
Once the sequence of events was clearly articulated and workgroup members were
satisfied with the depth and thoroughness of investigation, a narrative summary of the fall
was written and the de-identified data were entered into the web-based SFIM database. Data
stored in SFIM database were stripped of all personal identifiers and assigned a unique code.
The SSEs and their contributing factors were further analyzed for step four of the SFIM.
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Step three: Generic Error Modeling System (GEMS). In the SFIM, unsafe acts and
decisions are analyzed further using the Generic Error Modeling System (GEMS) (Reason,
1987). This system of modeling human error is used to determine:
•

the mindset of the person at the time of the event

•

if the error was skill-based, rule-based, or knowledge-based

•

which failure mode corresponded to a skill-based slip or lapse: inattention or overattention

•

which failure mode corresponded to a rule-based or knowledge-based mistake:
misapplication of good rules, application of a bad rule, biases, or heuristics.

•

which failure modes corresponded to a knowledge-based adaption: biases or
heuristics.

More detailed description of GEMS analysis is available in Reason (1987). This analysis was
completed by A. Zecevic for all case studies and results were not included in this thesis.

Step four: Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation analysis. The fourth step of
the SFIM maps contributing factors identified in step two to the Swiss Cheese Model of
Accident Causation developed by Reason (1990) and adapted for the SFIM by Zecevic et al.
(2007). The four levels of this model include: unsafe acts and decisions, preconditions,
supervision factors, and organizational factors. Each “slice of the cheese” represents a layer
of defense where an AE could be prevented. Holes in the defense layers can be both active
failures and latent conditions. For an AE to occur, “holes” on all four levels of defenses must
line up to allow an accident arrow to connect a vulnerable person and a hazard (Figure 1).
During this analysis the researcher identified the level of Swiss Cheese Model of Accident
Causation for each act, decision, and contributing factor. These data were entered into the
SFIM database to create a summary table of all contributing factors separated into the four
levels.
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Figure 1 SFIM's use of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation © Aleksandra A
Zecevic 2007.
Step five: Identifying Safety Deficiencies and Risk Assessment. At this time in the
within-case study analysis, the unsafe conditions and underlying factors were reviewed to
determine which of the factors had the most potential for adverse consequences, how
adequate the existing defenses were, and how potentially ameliorable each factor was. When
SFIM is used in healthcare organizations, the investigator works together with safety teams
to assign risk priorities and examine adequacy of current defenses. Considering that this was
a community based study, the level of risk was estimated as high for all safety significant
events and all safety deficiencies were given a high priority.
Step six: Development of safety actions. The final step in the SFIM investigative
process is to develop safety actions. The job of the SFIM investigator is to find what went
wrong and inform those in a position to implement changes. Those directly related to an
identified safety deficiencies are best able to determine how to correct the situation to close
the holes and improve defenses. This improves the safety not only for individuals involved in
the investigated AE, but for many other community dwelling older adults aging in place.
Knowledge translation activities have already involved sharing the SFIM reports with the
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county housing authority and the family health team. Plans are underway to share the results
with the Public Health Unit and the South West LHIN.

2.3.4 Data Analysis
Data analysis occurred in two phases. The first was within-case analysis that occurred during
the SFIM investigation process, as described above. The data collected from interviews and
other sources were reviewed and discussed with at least one and up to four other researchers.
This allowed for multiple perspectives, generation of hypotheses and expansion of the
investigation’s scope to additional contributing factors. This process facilitated credibility
and improved accuracy of the collected information (Ballinger, 2006; Creswell, 2013;
Salminen et al., 2006). Each contributing factor was further analyzed for placement within
the system-wide framework provided by the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation.
Upon completion of the investigation, the secondary reviewer (AZ) thoroughly reviewed the
final report and sequence of events of each case study for accuracy, consistency, coherence,
and quality.
The second phase of data analysis focused on similarities, patterns, and repetitions
between case studies and lead to identification of reoccurring themes. Eight summary tables,
one for each case, of contributing factors were analyzed using content analysis. This process
involved three researchers, and two cycles of analysis. Peer review, combined with
prolonged engagement with the data, was employed to increase the credibility of findings
(Ballinger, 2006; Creswell, 2013). The first stage of this analysis involved line by line coding
of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation tables, independently completed by three
researchers. The author then amalgamated the three code lists and met with the other two
researchers to discuss the final code list, establish consensus of all coders, and ensure that
the list was exhaustive and that each code was clearly defined and bounded (French et al.,
2001). Once the amalgamated coding list was completed, two researchers (the author and
supervisor AZ) independently re-coded all the contributing factors. Some minor
discrepancies were noted and, to create definitive boundaries, the code list was slightly
adjusted and definitions clarified to ensure consensus for a final code list. Supported by the
prolonged engagement with the data and convergence of the codes, the author identified four

24

distinct emergent themes of patterns and reoccurrences across multiple cases. Two other
researchers were involved with the author in discussion and consensus building around the
emergent themes.
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Chapter 3

3

Results

The results section begins with an overview of characteristics of the primary and secondary
participants, moving to a description of the eight investigated falls. Narrative summaries and
case study conclusions for each case study follow. Next, an overview of the contributing
factors is presented followed by presentation of emerging themes that resulted from content
analysis.

3.1 Primary Participants’ Characteristics
In total, eight individuals were recruited, but one person was immediately excluded
from the study because she was not receiving daily assistance from a caregiver nor was she
providing daily assistance to another person. The remaining seven individuals participated.
All participants experienced a fall. One participant experienced two falls, and both were
investigated as separate case studies, resulting in the total of eight case studies presented
here.
Participants ranged in age from 83 to 90 years, with an average age of 86 years. Table
1 describes characteristics of primary study participants. Each primary participant has been
given a pseudo name. Overall, all but one was female; one person had a moderate cognitive
impairment; an average of seven medications was prescribed for each participant (range 311); the majority of individuals were not using a mobility aid; and only one participant was a
caregiver. All were recipients of CCAC Homecare services in the past, but only one was
receiving CCAC Homecare at the time of the fall. After their falls, three participants began
receiving Homecare services. Two others received medical treatment for their falls but were
not admitted to Homecare afterwards, and one person moved to LTC.
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Table 1 Primary Participant Demographics for Falls Investigated With the SFIM
Formal homecare
receiver
Prior to At Time Post
fall
of fall
fall

Informal care
provided

3

None
(walker and cane )

yes

yes

yes

By spouse

Sex

Age

Mr.
Dee

M

83

Married

Normal

Mrs.
Kay

F

86

Widowed

Mild
impairment

N/A

7

None
(rollator walker)

yes

no

yes

By daughter

Mrs.
Bridge

F

90

Widowed

Moderate
impairment

14

4

None

yes

no

no

By nephew and
friends

Mrs.
Broom

F

85

Married

Normal

30

6

None

yes

no

yes

To spouse

Mrs.
Peters

F

88

Widowed

Normal

26

6

Bar height stool
(cane)

yes

no

no

By daughter

Mrs.
Rose

F

88

Widowed

Mild
Impairment

23

11

Straight back chair
(rollator walker)

yes

no

no

By son and two
daughters

Mrs.
Bee

F

84

Married

Normal

26

11

Transport
wheelchair

yes

no

yes

By and for
spouse
(interdependent)

Name

Cognitive
status

Equipment used at
time of fall
(usual mobility
aid)

Marital
status

MMSE
score/30

No. of
meds
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3.2 Secondary Participants’ Characteristics
The secondary participants included family members, friends, and formal caregivers
such as doctors, nurses, therapists, and CCAC case managers. Representatives of agencies
that had specialized knowledge and expertise about contributing factors, such as Alzheimer
Society, National Association for Home Builders, and public health nurse, were also
involved. They were not familiar with the case study occurrence but were aware of policies
and standard practices, such as recommendations for window blinds installation. Table 2
provides a summary of secondary participants for each case study and describes additional
non-human data sources that were consulted for completion of the investigations.
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Table 2 Summary of Secondary Participants and Description of Additional Data
Sources for Eight Case Studies
Investigation

Secondary participants

Additional data sources

Mr. Dee
ID*14801

Wife, nurse practitioner, family
physician, physiotherapist

Canoe website** for medication review

Mrs. Kay1
ID 15522

Daughter, nurse practitioner,
pharmacist and pharmacist technician,
certified window blind installer with15
years of experience, CCAC hospital
case manager (CM)

Primary care health record, two unrelated
pharmacy technicians from one large and one
small pharmacy

Mrs. Kay2
ID 15523

Daughter, nurse practitioner, PSW
supervisor for this supportive housing
building, occupational therapist, CCAC
hospital CM

Primary care health record; aging-in-place
design literature from Canada Mortgage and
Housing Corporation, National Association
for Home Builders and the Centre for
Universal Design

Mrs. Bridge
ID 15524

Nephew, family physician, friend,
CCAC community CM, occupational
therapist from 2010, Alzheimer Society
counselor

Primary care health record

Mrs. Broom
ID 15525

Spouse, daughter, occupational
therapist, public health nurse
overseeing falls prevention

Local hardware store survey of broom handle
styles on the brooms available for sale, online
broom handle style search

Mrs. Peters
ID 16036

Daughter, certified age-in-place
specialist, director of planning and
municipal services, social housing
administrator, building contractor/
landlord, community nurse

Aging-in-place design literature from Canada
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, National
Association for Home Builders and the
Centre for Universal Design

Mrs. Rose
ID 16259

Daughter, son-in-law, PSW, family
physician, occupational therapist,
physical therapist

Therapy provider reports, primary care health
records, CCAC referral for therapy

Mrs. Bee
ID 16383

Husband, nurse practitioner, secretary
from ophthalmologist office

Primary care health records, sales
representative from local vendor for
healthcare equipment, transport wheelchair
manufacturer literature from AMG and
Invacare

Notes: 1 & 2 indicate first and second adverse event for the same faller; * ID number provides a reference
for the full case study report in Appendix K-R; ** Canoe website for medication review
http://chealth.canoe.ca/drug_info.asp?relation_id=1196 was used for all investigations; CCAC is
Community Care Access Centre; CM is case manager; AMG is a healthcare equipment manufacturer.
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3.3 Characteristics of Falls Investigated
As previously indicated, all AEs investigated were falls; however one investigation also
uncovered a medication error. The error came to light after the fall, and although examined
within the context of the SFIM parameters, it was not the major trigger for the investigated
fall. Half of the falls occurred in the morning. All happened indoors: four in the kitchen, two
in the bedroom, one in the living room, and one at the front entrance of the home. Six of the
falls resulted in a visit to the hospital, with two fallers being admitted for hospital stay. Two
falls did not require medical attention and were divulged during a routine primary care visit.
Table 3 describes in more detail all the investigated falls.
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Table 3 Characteristics of Eight Investigated Falls and Their Consequences
Medical
attention
received

Investigation

Age

Fall location

Time
of fall

Mr. Dee
ID 14801

83

Kitchen

14:00

Routine
primary care
visit

None

Remained at
home

Mrs. Kay1
ID 15522

86

Living room

07:45

ER visit

Concussion

After ER visit
returned home
for one week

Mrs. Kay2
ID 15523

86

Bedroom

01:00

Admitted to
hospital

Back and right
leg pain; unable
to stand

Over 2 months
in the hospital;
considering a
return home
with CCAC
support

Mrs. Bridge
ID 15524

90

Front entrance

10:00

Admit to
hospital

Hip fracture

Admit to LTC

Mrs. Broom
ID 15525

85

Kitchen

09:00

ER visit

Humerus
fracture

Remained at
home

Mrs. Peters
ID 16036

88

Kitchen

18:45

ER visit

Staples for head
wound

Remained at
home

Mrs. Rose
ID 16259

88

Bedroom

14:30

Routine
primary care
visit

Bruising

Remained at
home

Mrs. Bee
ID 16383

84

Kitchen

22:30

ER visit

Rib fracture

Remained at
home

Note: 1 & 2 indicate first and second adverse event for the same faller

Injury sustained

Living situation
post fall
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3.4 Narrative Case Summaries
In-depth, detailed documentation of the case is required for naturalistic generalization from
the cases (Stake, 2005) and to allow readers to see the particularities of the cases and use
these details as examples for forming solutions (Salminen et al., 2006). Due to length, full
case reports generated by SFIM database are presented the appendices (Appendices K-R).
The within case analysis summary of each case, describing the contributing factors and how
they interconnected to result in the fall, are presented here.

3.4.1 Mr. Dee (ID 14801)
Mr. Dee, an 83 year old gentleman who lived with his wife in a small, compact home. He fell
backward in his kitchen on December 23, 2011. In 2009, he had slipped on snow and
fractured his left hip. He had a history of “blurred vision” when moving his head up and
down, which he never mentioned to his wife.
On the day of the fall, while his wife was in the next room setting up Christmas
decorations, he walked through the kitchen, without his cane or walker, to sit down at the
table. Wanting to help his wife out, he stopped at the counter to stir up bread cubes that were
drying for Christmas turkey stuffing. While completing the task, he moved his head up and
down, and his vision became blurry. He stumbled backwards and landed on the ground. He
was not injured. His wife heard the noise and came into the kitchen to assist him to stand up.
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of
Accident Causation.
•

Mr. Dee had a number of health related preconditions which contributed to the fall.
They were a past left hip fracture, poor proprioception in his left foot, poor balance,
as well as blurred vision associated with head movements and when standing up too
fast.

•

Mr. Dee‘s actions and decisions also contributed to this fall. He ambulated within the
small compact house without his rollator walker due to the constrained small spaces,
he did not mention his episodes of blurred vision to his new doctor or his wife
because the episodes were long standing, and he felt his compensation method of not
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standing up too fast was sufficient. Also, he was multitasking, when he moved his
head up and down while standing and stirring bread crumbs with both of his hands
occupied.
•

The compact, small home was unsuitable for an individual who requires constant use
of a rollator walker. Mr. Dee did not use his walker inside the home, which increased
his risk for falls.

•

The wife was occupied in the living room and unable to redirect Mr. Dee from
multitasking at the kitchen counter.

•

Medical files were not freely shared when a patient transfers from one family
physician to another. It is a common practice of doctors to charge patients to have
their medical files transferred. This fee covers the administrative, copying and
courier cost incurred by the physician and are not billable to the Ontario Ministry of
Health. Mr. Dee declined to pay the $70 transfer cost, and the new physician did not
insist on having Mr. Dee’s old medical record. To mitigate this situation, Mr. Dee’s
wife kept a record of his medical appointments, test results, diagnoses and
medications.

•

The wife’s medical history of Mr. Dee was incomplete. Mrs. Dee was unaware that
her thorough note keeping of medical tests and results was incomplete. The notes had
nothing about episodes of faller’s blurry vision.

•

The new physician accepted the medical history kept by Mrs. Dee in lieu of a medical
chart from the past physician. This information was assumed to be accurate in the
absence of a full medical record. Ultimately, the new physician was unaware of the
need to investigate physiological issues contributing to Mr. Dee’s blurred vision.

Unsafe actions and decisions of Mr. Dee, his wife, and doctor combined with contributing
latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation and
resulted in this adverse event.

3.4.2 Mrs. Kay (ID 15522, 15523)
The name Mrs. Kay was used for both investigations of the same participant. The name Mrs.
Kay1 refers to findings from investigation of her first fall (ID15522), and the name Mrs. Kay2
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refers to findings from investigation of her second fall (ID 15523). To avoid repetition of
generic person-related information two investigations are combined.
Mrs. Kay, an 85 year old woman living alone in a rental apartment, fell backward at
about 7:55 am on March 25, 2012. The building in which she lived was an apartment
building designated as a supportive housing building by the Local Health Integration
Network (LHIN). Mrs. Kay did not have a previous history of falls but did have a fear of
falling. A widow, she relied on her family, particularly one daughter who lived close, to
assist her with tasks around the apartment and to attend appointments with her. Mrs. Kay1’s
first fall occurred when she leaned to the right side to reach behind a lamp and access a cord
that opens the vertical blinds. This was a task she usually completed from a sitting and not a
standing position. When she straightened again, she stumbled backwards and fell, hitting her
head on the coffee table. Mrs. Kay1 called her grandson to help and was brought to ER and
diagnosed with a mild concussion as a result of this fall.
Mrs. Kay2’s second fall was just after midnight on April 1, 2012. On the night of this
fall, Mrs. Kay2 was hot, so she got out of bed to open the bedroom window and cool the
bedroom. She reached to the right and up over shoulder level, lost her balance, and fell to the
left side. She was unable to get up on her own and she pressed Lifeline. Her daughter and
son-in-law came to assist. Mrs. Kay2 had difficulty standing and was unable to walk even
with help. Daughter called an ambulance and Mrs. Kay2 was admitted to the hospital for
further investigation.
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors
were identified for both falls, and they included safety deficiencies within all four levels of
the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation.
•

Mrs. Kay had a number of health related preconditions that contributed to the falls.
She was deconditioned; she had decreased strength in her right shoulder; and her right
knee had buckled in the past and was unreliable for weight bearing. She had poor
balance and a fear of falling. She showed minor cognitive changes affecting her
ability to learn new tasks and was apprehensive in new situations. She was also taking
an extra dose of Avapro®, a blood pressure medication (150 mg dose in addition to
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the original 300mg dose). On March 27th the mistake was discovered by her nurse
practitioner and the dose was reduced to 300mg.
•

Mrs. Kay‘s actions and decisions also contributed to her falls: (1) Due to sentimental
attachment, Mrs. Kay1 and her family decided to retain extra living room furniture
when she downsized from house to an apartment; (2) Due to apprehensiveness in a
new environment, she decreased her activity level after moving to an apartment in
June 2011; (3) After a one week stay in the hospital, precipitated by a bladder
infection, she declined Community Care Access Centre (CCAC) services offered to
her at time of discharge in September 2011; (4) On the day of the first fall, she
awkwardly leaned over to the right and over-reached behind a lamp to pull open
vertical blinds; (5) . On the day of the second fall, she over-reached up and to the side
with both arms to pull a window open.

•

The physical environments also contributed to her falls: (1) The vertical blinds, which
were left in place by the previous tenants, had the pull cord positioned at the end
away from where the door opened, behind a lamp; (2) The bedroom windows height
was 48 inches from floor to the window sill and another 12 inches to the latch and
pull handle. The latches required both hands to pull the window open, one to hold the
latch down and the other to pull on the window; (3) The apartments did not have
individual thermostats, requiring Mrs. Kay2 to regulate room temperature by opening
and closing the windows. Many other seniors in the same building relied on the
assistance of personal support workers (PSWs) or family caregivers to open and close
the bedroom windows.

•

The daughter, her primary care giver, had less time to effectively reassure Mrs. Kay
in her new residence in the summer of 2011. The daughter’s husband was ill and her
own daughter was getting married. Other family members lived out of town or
worked full-time, limiting opportunities for visiting and encouraging Mrs. Kay to
increase her activity level. Also the summer was very hot, limiting outdoor mobility.
Mrs. Kay was reluctant to venture out on her own and became deconditioned.

•

The CCAC was in contact with Mrs. Kay in September 2011 during a hospital
admission. Mrs. Kay declined CCAC services because she decided to stay with her
daughter upon discharge, so the CCAC did not open a file after a bedside
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consultation. CCAC’s standard practice is not to follow-up with an individual when
services are declined since they are busy managing active cases. However, the CCAC
does have a “case management only” status, which allows for follow-up of an
individual for up-to three months when initially no services are put into place, but this
status is rarely used.
•

CCAC lacked a policy to follow-up with patients who declined services post-hospital
discharge to ensure the patient’s safety needs were met. Expectation of the hospital
CCAC case manager (CM) was that the patient will recall information given at the
time of discharge. Mrs. Kay was overwhelmed with information received close to
discharge, and she did not recall the CCAC information when she returned home after
her one month stay with family, when she stated she was experiencing difficulty with
standing transfers.

•

Family addressed Mrs. Kay’s decrease in strength by purchasing a lift chair in
October 2011. The daughter and Mrs. Kay did not consider physical therapy or
volunteer run senior exercise group available in the neighborhood to ameliorate
physical deterioration. The lift chair compensated for the weakness and difficulty
with standing transfers but contributed to Mrs. Kay’s further decline of strength.

•

Family assumed they had all necessary information on vertical blinds. The vertical
blinds’ pull cord was positioned at the side of the window blocked by a side table and
lamp when Mrs. Kay1 moved into the apartment in June 2011. The family chose to
keep the pull cord’s position, assuming that if the position was changed the blinds
would gather in front of the patio door and become a hazard. The family was unaware
of the option of changing the pull cord direction without changing position of the
blinds. The manufacturer instructions for the vertical blinds were not available from
the previous tenant, but, unknown to the family directions for changing the cord
position were available online.

•

Family yielded to Mrs. Kay1’s desire to retain her possessions from her previous
home. Extra furniture limited Mrs. Kay1’s access to the pull cord for the vertical
blinds that was left in place from the previous tenant.

•

The pharmacy’s policy was to give only verbal instructions for a medication change.
The pharmacy assumed the doctor had discussed and ensured Mrs. Kay1 understood
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the medication change. Mrs. Kay1’s daughter did not recall receiving the verbal
instructions from the pharmacist or from the prescribing doctor for Mrs. Kay1 to stop
the one dosage of Avapro before beginning the new dose. Mrs. Kay1 was unaware she
should stop the initial dose of Avapro and ended up taking an extra dose (300 mg plus
150 mg) of this blood pressure medication starting on March 19, 2012. This could
have affected her blood pressure when she was standing and reaching.
•

The Local Health Integration Network (LHIN) gave the distinction of “supportive
housing building” to the building where Mrs. Kay2 lived based on the large number of
seniors who were already living there. The supportive housing program allowed for
greater number of funded services to eligible seniors. Mrs. Kay2 specifically moved to
this building because of the building’s supportive housing designation. However, the
building had some features that were unsatisfactory for the needs of seniors, such as
high windows, narrow bathroom door, baseboard heater in front of patio door, etc.

•

The CCAC intake case manager, who works in-office taking information regarding
incoming referrals, delayed putting PSW assistance in place after Mrs. Kay2’s two fall
incidents earlier in the week, even though the daughter had reported to the intake CM
that her mother required assistance and was at risk for more falls. Some intake CM’s
practice was to delay PSW initiation until the OT and the community CM completed
assessments to confirm what level of assistance was required.

Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Kay, her family, her pharmacist, the CCAC, and the
LHIN combined with contributing latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese
Model of Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse event.

3.4.3 Mrs. Bridge (ID 15524)
Mrs. Bridge, a 90 year old lady, lived alone in her own home. She was a very independent,
active, “on the go” lady. She played bridge weekly with a consistent group of friends and was
a member of a local service club. Seven weeks prior to her fall, Mrs. Bridge had her
remaining five teeth extracted, so her dental plate no longer fit. Her nephew visited twice a
day to ensure she had soft meals and to see that she was well. On March 28, 2012, at 10:00
am, Mrs. Bridge fell inside the front door of her home and fractured her right hip. Her
nephew found her when he went to pick her up for a dental appointment. She reported that
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she had gone outside to check her flowers and fell when she re-entered. The inner front door
was closed, and judging from the direction of landing, it was likely that she stumbled after
turning to close the door.
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of
Accident Causation.
•

Mrs. Bridge had a number of health related preconditions that contributed to the fall.
They were: history of falls, poor balance, and decreased cognition (14/30 on the
MMSE post fall).

•

Mrs. Bridge‘s actions and decisions also contributed: she inconsistently visited her
doctor, frequently skipped taking prescribed medication, declined medical advice,
declined installation of Lifeline®, and discontinued daily CCAC support services.
She historically had a laissez faire attitude to life, an independent (reportedly
stubborn) personality, and persuasive verbal skills.

•

Family supervision was not available to monitor Mrs. Bridge’s actions and
compliance with medical advice prior to 2011. She was widowed and had no
children. She attended medical appointments alone, and there were no informal
caregivers to monitor adherence to medical advice. When her nephew began to visit
weekly in 2011, he provided transportation only and did not want to be “snoopy”
regarding his aunt’s affairs.

•

Mrs. Bridge’s friends felt that they did not have the authority to intervene with her
choices. Mrs. Bridge was able to “fool” those around her to hide her cognitive
weaknesses. When the friends noticed an increase in Mrs. Bridge’s disheveled
appearance and inappropriate actions, such as taking moldy cheese to a social event,
they felt helpless. Friends were unaware that community agencies such as the
Alzheimer Society could provide suggestions on how to support a person with any
type of cognitive decline.

•

PSW visit times were inconsistent and did not always meet Mrs. Bridge’s needs or
preferences. Timing of CCAC PSW visits reportedly interfered with Mrs. Bridge’s
routine, leading to discontinuation of service. CCAC was only able to keep a file open
to monitor a client for three months, at which time, if no services were introduced, the
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case manager must close the file. In 2010, Mrs. Bridge gave the false impression that
she was managing well with the supports from her friends. The CCAC file was closed
and not reopened. When CCAC services were discontinued, the only formal way of
monitoring her cognitive decline and high fall risk was lost.
•

Mrs. Bridge’s doctor was unaware that CCAC services were discontinued and did not
know about any safety concerns the CCAC service personnel may have had when the
file was closed. The CCAC does not send a discharge report to the primary care
physician when services are discontinued.

•

The family physician lacked a method to trigger a recall visit to reassess a patient
with consistent but slow cognitive decline or a history of falls, although such followup visits are standard practice for individuals with diabetes.

•

Neither the CCAC CM nor the family physician formally questioned Mrs. Bridge’s
capacity to make her own decisions. Their standard practice was to err on the side of
caution when cognitive capacity was in question, to preserve an individual’s rights. A
capable person is entitled to make choices that may not appear to be the best choice in
the opinion of others. Mrs. Bridge’s capacity to make decisions had not been formally
assessed by a capacity assessor. A capacity assessor can be any health care
professional who has been trained through the Ministry of the Attorney General to
determine whether an individual is mentally capable of certain types of decisionmaking. The family doctor rarely requested that a patient have a capacity assessment
completed. The regular practice was to wait until an individual is admitted to the
hospital and have the hospital healthcare team deem an individual unsuitable for
return home due to cognitive impairment.

•

There was a lack of communication between doctor, nephew, friends, and CCAC.
This enabled Mrs. Bridge’s cognitive decline to continue unaddressed.

Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Bridge, her nephew, her friends, the CCAC, and doctor
combined with contributing latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of
Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse event.

39

3.4.4 Mrs. Broom (ID 15525)
Mrs. Broom, an 85 year old lady, fell on February 24, 2012, inside the home she shared with
her husband. She fell forward, landed on her right arm, and fractured her humerus. Mrs.
Broom was responsible for all the meals and household chores for herself and her husband.
On the day of the fall, she tripped over a broom handle as it slipped along a kitchen counter
to the floor in front of her. In the rush to get things done on the morning of the fall, she had
intentionally left the broom leaning on the kitchen counter. Mrs. Broom was aware the broom
position was unsafe, as the broom had slid and fallen to the floor in the past. After the fall
she required medical attention at the emergency department of the hospital.
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of
Accident Causation.
•

Mrs. Broom had a number of health related preconditions which contributed to the
fall. They were: history of one previous fall, history of arthritis, right hip replacement
in 2008, arthritis in left hip, and a decreased reaction time related to age and reduced
activity level.

•

Mrs. Broom’s actions and decisions also contributed: rushing while multitasking and
leaving a broom that had a history of sliding down leaned against the counter.

•

Fall prevention education programs provided by the local Health Unit were not
reaching seniors in the community or influencing change in their unsafe behaviours.
A formal, public fall prevention session has not been offered in this small town by the
Public Health Unit since 2006. The Health Unit changed focus from formal
workshops on falls prevention to printed media messages to educate seniors about fall
prevention. Mrs. Broom had never seen these media messages, although she regularly
reads local newspapers.

•

Fall prevention education from OT was not memorable for Mrs. Broom. She did not
recall safety suggestions provided by OT at the time of hip surgery in 2008, or even
after this most recent fall. Mrs. Broom has no recollection of being formally educated
on fall prevention strategies, though the CCAC had put therapy services into place
both times to assure safety in her home.
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•

Brooms similar to the one Mrs. Broom used were manufactured with handles that do
not have a non-slip surface to prevent sliding when leaned against a counter. Most
brooms have varnished or PVC coated handles, which are smooth, allowing the
handle to slide when placed against a counter. There were no brooms with non-slip
handles available for purchase in the local stores.

•

Daughter, after sitting in on therapy session, was unable to convince Mrs. Broom to
incorporate more fall prevention strategies into her daily activities, such as wall
mounted grab bars in the bathroom and gate in front of open stairway. Mrs. Broom
felt that recommended changes did not apply to her and her current functional status.
Mrs. Broom was a competent adult; her daughter was unable to enforce her
suggestions.

Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Broom combined with contributing latent conditions at
all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse
event.

3.4.5 Mrs. Peters (ID 16036)
Mrs. Peters, an 88 year old lady, fell on April 30, 2012 at 6:45 pm while reaching low into a
deep corner cupboard for an infrequently used bowl. Mrs. Peters had made some strawberry
sauce that evening and wanted to put it away. She needed to access a bowl stored in the back
of a difficult to reach, lower, deep corner cupboard. She leaned over, supporting herself on a
tall stool, and reached to the back of the cupboard for the large bowl. She placed the bowl on
the counter, but before she was able to stand again, the stool tipped sideways, and she fell
over backwards. Mrs. Peters moved into this newly built apartment building, dedicated for
low-income seniors and persons with a disability, in April 2011, a year before the fall.
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of
Accident Causation.
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•

Mrs. Peters had a number of health related preconditions that contributed to the fall.
They were: a past fall in the bathroom of her previous residence, blood pressure
medication, and poor balance.

•

Mrs. Peters’ actions and decisions also contributed: multitasking while leaning on a
stool and reaching forward into a deep cupboard.

•

Family assisted Mrs. Peters to store some kitchen items in a difficult to reach, low,
deep corner cabinet when she moved into the apartment. Family was aware of the
awkward design of this kitchen cabinet, and assisted Mrs. Peters to store less
frequently used items there. The kitchen design was such that easily accessible
storage space between shoulder and waist height was not available. Mrs. Peters had
no option but to store items that required occasional access in a difficult to reach area.

•

Age-in-place design features were not implemented in the units geared to seniors in
this newly built apartment building, although the checklists with age-in-place design
recommendations was readily available on-line.

•

The County housing authority’s procedure for awarding a $1.7 million contract for
construction of this senior friendly building did not include requirements for age-inplace design features.

•

Both the contractor and the County housing authority were unfamiliar with age-inplace design features.

•

Ontario building code also does not include age-in-place design considerations.
Wheelchair accessibility design features and universal design guidelines are
integrated into the Ontario building code, but specific age-in-place designs are not
mandatory.

Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Peters, family, County housing authority and builder
combined with contributing latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of
Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse event.

3.4.6 Mrs. Rose (ID 16259)
Mrs. Rose, an 88 year old lady, fell inside her home on the afternoon of May 10, 2012 while
reaching for a container of TUMS®. She had recently returned home from the adult day
program, and her stomach was upset. She walked to the bedroom, where she leaned on the
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back of a chair with her left hand as she reached forward with her right hand to a narrow
shelving unit in the corner. As she grasped the container of TUMS®, she straightened, lost
her balance and fell backward to the left side, pulling the chair with her. She was able to use
her Lifeline® service and obtain assistance from her family, who lived across the road, to get
up from the fall. Medical attention was not required after the fall.
•

This event was investigated using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM).
Multiple contributing factors were identified and they included deficiencies within all
four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation. Mrs. Rose had a
number of health related preconditions which contributed to the fall. They were:
arthritis, decrease range of motion in her right shoulder, decreased endurance, poor
balance which noticeably worsened when Mrs. Rose was fatigued, 11 prescription
medications, re-occurring upset stomach, a previous stroke with residual left side
weakness and decreased coordination (Dec 31, 2012), and history of frequent bladder
infections and cellulitis.

•

The following Mrs. Rose’s actions and decisions contributed: she did not follow up
with home exercise routines, she stored the frequently used TUMS® in a difficult to
reach location, she ‘fired’ her daily PSW support and declined follow up attempts by
the occupational therapist from CCAC.

•

The initial OT services offered by the CCAC after Mrs. Rose’s stroke focused on
equipment needs and mobility safety within the home. The OT only completed initial
assessment and there were no follow-up visits. The location of frequently used items,
such as her TUMS®, was not discussed. Attempts for further follow-up from this OT
were declined by the Mrs. Rose. She was overwhelmed by the number of different
support workers and therapists coming into her home.

•

Multiple PSWs were assigned to care for Mrs. Rose. Daily PSW visits were difficult
to cover with a consistent time and staff member. New clients who require daily visits
were scheduled within existing time schedules of PSWs. If additional PSWs were
recruited to cover the ‘ideal’ morning preparation hours (7-9 am), there would be
fewer hours of work for each PSW. The PSWs who want eight hours of pay per day
have to work approximately 12 hours a day to offset the time lost between
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appointments. PSW visitation hours are controlled by the agency’s schedulers who
are not familiar with the preferences of clients receiving service.
•

PSW visit times to Mrs. Rose’s home varied each day. Mrs. Rose was asked not to
dress until the PSW arrives to assist her with the bath. Mrs. Rose did not like waiting
in her night gown for the PSW to arrive, which would be sometimes in late morning
and sometimes not at all.

•

Family left TUMS® at the same location where Mrs. Rose had them prior to the
stroke. The family was unaware of the difficulty Mrs. Rose had in accessing
TUMS®. The family members came in twice a day, or more if needed, to assist Mrs.
Rose with other activities such as glucose check, insulin shot, meals, and letting out
the dog. Any difficulties with daily tasks were addressed as they arose, such as
moving the microwave to another location for easier access and the eventual
relocation of TUMS® to the kitchen.

•

There was a lack of caregiver assistance after the adult day program, when Mrs. Rose
was fatigued. The staff transporting Mrs. Rose home ensured she entered the home
safely but did not assist with in-home tasks.

Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Rose, family, occupational therapist, agency providing
PSW services, and CCAC combined with contributing latent conditions at all four levels of
the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse event.

3.4.7 Mrs. Bee (ID 16383)
Mrs. Bee, an 84 year old living with her husband, fell forward while walking to the kitchen
and holding onto her wheelchair at 22:30 on May 24, 2012. Mrs. Bee had had cataract
surgery the week before her fall that caused extra stress on her husband and herself. The
couple had been interdependent on one another, and the eye surgery caused increase in Mrs.
Bee’s dependence on the husband, who also had multiple health issues. On the night of the
fall, Mrs. Bee felt guilty, and although tired, she wanted to help her husband in the kitchen
before going to bed. She tripped on her feet while walking and holding onto AMG Airgo®
transport wheelchair. The transport wheelchair moved too far ahead, and she fell forward.
Later the same night, the husband took her to the emergency department, because Mrs. Bee
was unable to transfer out of her bed due to severe pain in her side.
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Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of
Accident Causation.
•

Mrs. Bee had a number of health related preconditions which contributed to the fall.
They were: macular degeneration in addition to the recent cataract surgery; a fall
three years ago which resulted in fractured vertebrae and back pain that caused
muscle spasms when her activity level was too high; poor mobility, and decreased
strength. On the night of the fall Mrs. Bee was tired and irritable.

•

Mrs. Bee‘s actions and decisions also contributed: she ambulated around the house
holding a transport wheelchair; she discontinued her physical therapy exercises; she
decided to not follow up with a referral to a pain management clinic; and after her
cataract surgery she carried on with most daily activities without asking for increased
assistance from other her children, friends, or the Community Care Access Centre.

•

Family physician and ophthalmologist assumed that Mrs. Bee will be able to manage
daily activities after her cataract surgery with her current level of support. Options for
in-home help to decrease the burden on Mrs. Bee and her elderly husband after
surgery were not reviewed. Mrs. Bee was of the understanding that being extra
cautious after her eye surgery would be enough to keep her safe. The elderly couple
was interdependent on each other for daily functioning, and the couple’s strategy for
completing tasks together was disrupted after Mrs. Bee’s reduced ability to contribute
post eye surgery.

•

Standard practice for post cataract surgery home support services was that CCAC
does not get involved as long as the operated individual was physically capable of
administering the post-surgery eye drops. In addition, CCAC services were mandated
only for personal care assistance, such as bathing. Although Mrs. Bee’s husband was
able to assist with administration of eye drops, his own health issues prevented his
greater involvement in everyday household activities. After a week of administering
eye drops four times a day, in addition to the regular household tasks, he reached his
limit. The couple became stressed and irritable with each other, which increased Mrs.
Bee’s fall risk because she attempted to perform activities when fatigued and beyond
her limits.
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•

Her son and daughter continued with original level of support for this inter-dependent
couple; son visited as needed to help with home maintenance issues, and daughter
came biweekly to clean the home. After the cataract surgery the co-dependent balance
changed for Mr. and Mrs. Bee, but their increased need for assistance was not
communicated to their social network. This lack of support increased the stressors
leading to the fall.

•

Mrs. Bee chose to use a transport wheelchair for mobility inside the house since it
allowed her to sit and foot propel herself around the home when her back ached. She
did not want to have a walker in addition to this wheelchair. She was concerned about
increasing her fall risk due to too many pieces of equipment to potential to trip on
them with her decreased vision. She was unaware of another possible mobility aid;
namely walker-transport wheelchair combo, which combines the features of the
transport wheelchair (safely seated while moving) with rollator walker features (brake
levers at the handles to use when walking with the aid). Health care equipment
vendors rarely marketed the walker-transport wheelchair at senior events, as they
perceived this mobility aid to be a specialty item, requested by therapists for clients.
However, the walker-transport wheelchair combo was a good and safe alternative for
seniors like Mrs. Bee.

•

As with most assistive devices obtained second hand, a user manual did not
accompany the transport wheelchair when Mrs. Bee got it from a family member. The
original instructions for the transport wheelchair instructed the user to have assistance
of another person to apply brakes before transfers and to not use the chair as a rollator
walker, which is what Mrs. Bee did. When instructions do not accompany an assistive
device, the risk of inappropriate use of that device increases creating an added safety
risk.

•

Transport wheelchairs lack permanent safety labels. The transport wheelchair
manufacturer did supply a safety instructions page with new transport wheelchairs but
not a permanent safety label attached on the assistive device.

Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Bee, family, and doctors combined with contributing
latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation and
resulted in this adverse event.
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3.5 Identified Contributing Factors
The SFIM investigations revealed numerous contributing factors for each AE. The
contributing factors were temporally linked and successive, leading from one into another
and involved factors at each of four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation.
The Sequence of Events (SOE) diagrams, included in each case study report (Appendices KR), established the timeline of the events that led up to the impact and linked the contributing
factors (ovals) to each safety significant event (bolded rectangles). The Swiss Cheese Model
of Accident Causation summary table is also included in case study report for each
investigation (Appendices K-R). It specifies the layer of defense (unsafe acts and decisions,
preconditions, supervision, and organizational level) for each contributing factor.
An average of 35 (range of 22-47) contributing factors (CFs) was identified in each
case study. A total of 280 factors were found over the eight cases. Most of the factors were
preconditions, average 15 (total 120, range 9-23); followed by Acts and Decisions, average
10 (total 76, range 7-12); Supervision, average 7 (total 58, range 2-13); and Organizational
Factors, average 5 (total 40, range 2-9). When all repetitions were eliminated, there were a
total of 247 unique factors; 68 Acts and Decisions, 101 preconditions, 41 Supervision, and 37
Organizational. The eight Swiss Cheese tables of contributing factors were used in content
analysis for identification of between-cases similarities.

3.6 Content Analysis Results
In this section the researcher first reflects on the process of establishing codes of patterns and
similarities, followed by a summary of the four emerging themes associated with safety of
care- dependent community dwelling older adults.

3.6.1 Coding List Formation
The first step of coding list formation was completed independently by three researchers
(DG, AZ, and AS) on the full data set (DG and AZ) or half the data set (AS) and it produced
15 main codes. Seven were stand-alone codes and eight were further divided into 2-5 subcodes. Once the independent lists of draft codes were consolidated, the research team met to
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discuss discrepancies and come to consensus on unresolved issues. The second round of
coding was completed by two researchers (DG and AZ) on the full dataset and produced only
minor discrepancies, primarily related to some the sub-codes. Six codes required
consolidation with other codes to tighten up and create definitive boundaries between the
codes. The list was shortened to 10 main codes, seven of which had 2-4 sub-codes (Appendix
S). Every contributing factor was coded into one of the generated codes. The code “other”
included only three of the 280 contributing factors

3.6.2 Overarching Themes
Through inductive analysis of the coded dataset, four main themes emerged to complete the
puzzle of safety breakdowns for care-dependent older adults and their caregivers who age in
place. These themes relate not only to the ‘what’, but in using a systemic investigation
method, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of each event are also discovered. Each of the codes from the
analysis process contributed a piece of the puzzle, demonstrating how for these seven
individuals the defense layers described by the Swiss Cheese Accident Causation Model did
not provide sufficient protection. There were holes in the defense layers. Safety was
compromised and resulted in an AE. The four themes that emerged from these codes relate to
the safety breakdowns that occur while aging-in-place, and will need to be ameliorated for
society to find solutions to these breakdowns. The themes are:
•

Everyday living has become risky,

•

Limitations with supervision,

•

Disconnects within the system, and

•

Poor safety risk identification and follow-up.

3.6.2.1

Everyday Living has Become Risky

Care-dependent older persons aging in place and their caregivers were performing ordinary,
routine everyday activities, such as stirring up the stuffing, opening window blinds, opening
bedroom window, entering the home, cleaning the house, pulling out a bowl from a
cupboard, picking up TUMS, or helping to put leftovers away after dinner, at the time of the
fall. However, these mundane activities became risky because they combined with personal
factors, such as impaired body functions that resulted in poor balance, poor endurance, poor
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reaction times, decrease range of motion, or decreased vision. The ordinary activities also
combined with individuals’ personalities, such as fearfulness, determination to be very
independent, laissez faire attitude, anxiety, and stress. The normal activities have also
become risky due to polypharmacy and medication errors, fixed designs of physical
environments, and the natural world environment, where examples include: limited space to
operate assistive devices in home, high windows, hard to access storage space, a cloudy day,
and a hot summer. Several product designs used by the fallers added to normal functioning
becoming more risky, such as slippery broom handle, a stool that easily tips over, or a
transport wheelchair that is mistakenly used as a walker.
In an attempt to do their best to meet challenges of aging-in-place, older adults
frequently made maladaptive choices. Some had an overpowering desire to stay independent,
while others refused to acknowledge functional changes that were occurring in their aging
bodies. Examples here include retaining extra furniture after a move into a smaller apartment,
laughing off concerns pointed out by friends, rejecting safety suggestion made by family for
improvement of the home environment, continuing with activities even when fatigued, and
putting up with debilitating pain. Everyday living also became risky when the faller refused
help from others and accepted the risk of a potential fall or injury or judged that the risk was
worthwhile to accommodate his/her personal preferences, such as declining to pay for
medical file transfer, discontinuing CCAC services, avoiding to see a doctor, not followingup with medical recommendations, and discontinuing home PT exercises. Occasionally, due
to lack of knowledge or incorrect information, the fallers perceived their situation as
unchangeable and were doing their best to compromise, accommodate and compensate.
Examples here include ‘furniture walking’ in a home too small to easily accommodate a
walker, reaching into a low cupboard while leaning on a stool because of a lack of storage
space at a suitable height, using a transport wheelchair because it offers a place to sit and foot
propel when back pain increases, declining a pain clinic appointment because of a lengthy
application and long drive to the clinic. At times fallers, their caregivers, policy makers,
designers, builders, and others involved made a maladaptive choice without realizing that
long term consequences of their choice could be unsafe. Some examples of individuals who
had the full intention of doing the right thing, and were unaware of the potentially risky
consequences, are: compensating for blurred vision by slowing down, declining CCAC home
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support service at time of hospital discharge, introducing an electric lift chair to help with sitto-stand transfers, prescribing a new dose of medication, or designing a kitchen with a
difficult to reach cupboard. It was the combination of personal factors, environmental factors,
and maladaptive choices that contributed to increased safety risk of ordinary everyday tasks
for care dependent older persons and their caregivers.

3.6.2.2

Limitations With Supervision

Limitations in supervision, from both informal and formal care providers, increased the
safety risk for older persons and the potential for occurrence of AEs. Limitations of informal
caregiver’s availability contributed to many of the investigated falls. Some older persons had
no children or spouse to consistently monitor their functional and cognitive decline or
question their safety choices. When children or siblings were present, they did not always
have the time to assist as often as needed due to their own family and work commitments,
such as an ill husband, a daughter getting married, or full time work. Some family members
lived out of the area and, although willing to assist, were not consistently accessible for
provision of care. For the co-dependent couple, the partner had his own health issues
affecting his functional abilities, creating an interdependency balance that was tipped
unfavourably when something new, such as cataract surgery, occurred.
Supervision limitations of formal caregivers were related to the workload and
scheduling realities of formal caregivers. CCAC case managers’ schedules did not allow
follow-up on patients who declined services at the time of hospital discharge. PSW
scheduling policies prevented consistent timing of PSW visits, leading to strained
relationships with the care recipient and cancelations of services by the care recipient.
Supervision supports were also found to be ineffectual for decreasing the risk of an
AE. Both formal and informal caregivers yielded to the older person’s choices to avoid being
paternalistic or when unable to persuade the older individual to accept a safer alternative.
This is well described in the words of one son-in-law caregiver, who was concerned about a
perceived push to have his mother-in-law (who fired all her PSW support services) admitted
to LTC because of past falls:
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“I don’t know if there is any real way you could prevent or improve [safety for
community seniors][…] because there is still an independent minded person…it is
just something that’s going to happen. You can’t rubber pad all the walls and all the
furniture you know…you have to be careful, when you start thinking of ways to help
them [independent older adults] because sometimes you take away their
independence and that makes them more resistive and makes them angry […] so if
you can help them to keep some of their independence, that’s what we need to be
doing…I don’t blame them one bit [for taking risks, firing workers, trying to keep
control].” (Mrs. Rose’s son-in-law)
Those supervising older adults frequently tried to help the elder maintain some
independence, even if that meant accepting greater risk. Other examples of ineffectual formal
and informal supervision and yielding to an older adult’s preference included: a physician
accepting the new elderly patient without a medical file transfer, family yielding to the
elder’s desire to keep extra furniture that was cluttering the new apartment, friends not
intervening when they witnessed bizarre behavior from an elderly person slipping into
cognitive decline, CCAC manager erring on the side of caution when cognitive capacity of a
client was questioned, family/doctor/ therapist being unable to convince the faller or enforce
faller’s compliance with healthcare recommendations. Many of the caregivers were willing to
accept a certain level of risk in order to help the older person achieve the goal of aging-inplace, but this yielding also increased the likelihood of an AE occurrence.

3.6.2.3

Disconnects Within the System

Disconnects between older persons and their support systems, as well as disconnects between
the different members of the support systems, contributed to the investigated falls.
Incomplete, lacking or inadequate communication was a powerful factor that contributed to
disconnect in the support system. Communication was incomplete when there was an
unrealistic expectation to recall instructions, which led to poor follow-up by the participant or
caregiver. For example, only verbal instructions were given by the doctor to the older adult
and by the pharmacist to the caregiver without written reminders; instructions to contact the
CCAC if the elder’s care needs change were given at the time of hospital discharge when
older adults are overwhelmed with the amount of instructions they receive; occupational
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therapist reviewed fall prevention tips with the older adult one time, on the day of initial
assessment, and were not reviewed further.
Communication was lacking when information was not available, when it was not
transferred from one health care provider to another, when it was not quickly accessible, or
simply was not passed on by the older adult. Poor care transitions and poor discharge plans
also lead to poor communication. Examples from investigated case studies include: changes
in health status were not communicated by the older adult to his caregivers because he
assumed that what he felt was normal; medical file from previous physician was not
transferred to the new physician, limiting to the knowledge about the past medical history;
access to electronic record of current medications was unavailable; instructions on how to
use newly prescribed medication was not conveyed to the older adult by her caregiver; family
doctor was not informed that CCAC discharged a patient at high safety risk; a patient with
potential for continued deterioration and increased fall risk was discharged from the hospital
without a plan for follow-up by the formal healthcare system.
Poor communication about available resources from support agencies resulted in
misinformation and lack of awareness. Examples include: benefits of pain clinic were not
explained or evident to the older person when she received the lengthy referral application in
the mail, media messages on fall prevention in the local newspaper initiated by the local
Health Unit were not noticed by the older adult who read the paper daily, community
services for supporting individuals with declining cognitive abilities were unknown to
faller’s friends, benefits of exercise programs for maintenance of physical abilities were not
evident to some of the older adults or their caregivers.
The last systemic disconnect identified was that home services, which were meant to
improve the older person’s life, ended up disrupting his/her life. The lack of flexibility and
rigidity in provision of support from the CCAC resulted in rejection of the services that did
not match the lifestyle and needs of the older care recipient. In one case, a client was not
allowed to dress until PSW arrived to provide care. However, the PSW’s arrival time was
inconsistent and spanned between 8 – 11 am. After spending several mornings in a
nightgown waiting to start her day until 11 am, the care recipient refused further service and
had her family come daily. The PSW services were strictly guided by a CCAC care plan that
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did not accommodate for client’s personal schedule or preference. In addition, an atmosphere
of reprimand kept care recipients compliant and quiet. For example, if the PSW was
scheduled to give a bath on a certain day, the older adult felt obliged to have the bath, even if
the bath was not wanted, because the care recipient was under the perception that the PSW
services would be cut off if he/she did not follow the prescribed plan.
These system-wide disconnects were directly linked to the contributing factors in
investigated AEs. In the words of Mrs. Bee, whose fractured rib was initially missed during
her ER visit and who had to make multiple calls to the CCAC to receive much needed PSW
support twice a day:
“My own experience right now is that somehow the client gets lost in the shuffle and
it wasn’t meant to be that way, and no one person is doing that. It’s just we haven’t
got a system smooth enough […] I was not impressed with what was happening to me
[…]. I know they [the CCAC/LHIN] are going through struggles and a lot of changes,
but because of that and trying to follow the rules, people [care recipients] are getting
lost a little bit…and that’s when the health care system gets costly, because it
shouldn’t have happened in the first place.” (Mrs. Bee)
“People are getting lost a little bit…” does not just apply to care-dependent older
adults who get ‘lost’ in the system’s service cracks, but disconnects in the system also mean
that family members, friends, agencies, health organizations, and policy makers who support
and cater to older adults get ‘lost a little bit’ too.

3.6.2.4

Poor Safety Risk Identification and Follow-Up

The inability of the larger societal system, health care system, as well as family and friends to
recognize safety risks for older adults, or to correctly manage known safety risks, contributed
to falls for the participants in this study. Inadequate policies for assurance of the safety of
older persons, minimal involvement from support systems, and changeable physical
environmental factors that do not meet the needs of the older person all relate to this theme of
poor safety risk identification and follow-up.
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Society seems to have a laissez faire attitude towards the safety of older persons
living independently in community. An example of this casual approach was the lack of
adequate policies for supportive housing, which is predominantly utilized by the elderly,
resulting in apartments that had design features that do not match the abilities of older adults
with health issues. This study uncovered that an older building located in a naturally
occurring retirement community and designated for supportive housing: 1. had high windows
with latches that were very difficult for an elderly person to open; 2. did not have
independent thermostat to regulate bedroom temperature thereby requiring the elderly
resident to open a window when room was too hot; 3. had narrow bathroom doors that did
not allow an average width rollator walker to fit through; and 4. had a baseboard heater that
created a high step between living room and the balcony.
Housing architecture and interior design problems were not exclusive to older
buildings but occurred in the newly built apartment buildings too. Insufficient building codes
for publicly funded housing designated for older adults resulted in a newly built apartment
building with design features that did not meet the long-term needs of senior residents who
want to age-in-place. For example: windows latches were too high, storage space options in
the kitchen were either too high or too low, and fiberglass tub surrounds lacked pre-installed
grab bars. The local housing authority and the builder were both satisfied that the building
met the building codes, and it did. The building was fully accessible, and the ground floor
apartment units, dedicated to persons with disabilities, were fully wheelchair accessible.
However, the housing authority and builder did not consider specific needs of older adults,
which are different from the needs of persons with disabilities or needs of the general adult
population. They were unaware that casement windows are easier to manage because these
windows have a crank handle for opening that is positioned low; a pantry cupboard for
kitchen storage is a more accessible option; and grab bars pre-installed in the bathroom
would have safety benefits for all the older residents.
Other examples of how formal societal support system failed to recognize and safely
manage safety risks for an older person were: a lack of a policy and procedure to allow the
family doctor to monitor an individual who did not have close family but was experiencing
considerable cognitive decline; the common practice of renewing prescription medications
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over the phone with the pharmacist for extended periods of time; and the practice of waiting
for an individual to be hospitalized to assess her cognitive capacity rather than contesting it
while she is living in community. Three other interesting examples of systemic issues that
lead to increased safety risks are: the practice of doctors’ offices to charge the patient $70 for
medical file transfer from one physician to another which, if patient refuses to pay, means
that new physician will not have a complete health history; the lack of permanently attached
safety instructions to follow along with donated assistive devices and home health
equipment; and lack of training opportunities on how to use donated assistive devices.
In some case studies, marginal involvement of formal support systems contributed to
poor risk identification and management. This occurred in situations when only basic
requirements were completed by formal as well as informal supports, and more critical
evaluation of an older person’s situation was overlooked. Examples include: pharmacist
assumed that the doctor explained a medication change (e.g., stop old dosage and start new
dosage of the same medication) to the patient and filled a prescription without clarifying with
the doctor; a family member avoided getting involved in the caregiving of his aunt out of fear
that he might be perceived as “snoopy”, even though the aunt exhibited unusual behaviors
related to cognitive decline; a doctor ended a visit with a patient at high risk of cognitive
decline without completing a cognitive screening; fall prevention education programs
provided by occupational therapists and the local Health Unit were not reaching their target
population in an effective way to change behaviours of older adults; instructions provided by
the hospital on how to manage safety after eye surgery were vague and illness specific.
When indoor environments were arranged in ways that challenged the function of
older persons, and formal and informal supervisors did not recognize the hazard or address
the hazard in a timely manner, this led to AEs. For example: the landlord of the building
inhabited by high number of seniors in advanced age did not adjust the position of window
blinds pull cords to allow easier access and use; and the family and CCAC support workers
left TUMS® that were regularly used by the senior on a shelf that was difficult to access.
Poor safety risk identification and management directly related to the investigated AEs.
Clearly, falls of community dwelling care dependent seniors and their caregivers are
complex events. For each fall over 30 contributing factors at all levels within the system were

55

identified. Any meaningful change and improvements of safety in this population will have
to arise from innovative system-wide far-reaching falls prevention programs.
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Chapter 4

4

Discussion

In this study, eight case studies were conducted to examine factors that contributed to AEs in
care-dependent community living older adults and their caregivers. All of the falls
investigated involved adults over the age of 83 years. Only one case involved a caregiver.
Over 240 factors were identified as contributors to these falls, each representing a hole in one
of the safety defense layers of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation. When holes
on all four defense layers linked, safety barriers were breached and culminated in the fall of
the older person. Some of the factors were sharp-end factors and had a direct connection to
the AE, such as bending over with a stool for support, but others were latent factors, such as
influence of blood pressure medication and poor storage space options, and represented the
proverbial ‘accident waiting to happen’. Cross-case analysis of the contributing factors from
each case was completed and four distinct themes related to safety of older adults emerged.
At first glance it would appear that the identified overarching themes: Everyday living
has become risky, Limitations with supervision, Disconnects within the system, and Poor risk
identification and follow-up add nothing startlingly new. Previous literature has reported that
the person-related factors of those requiring care will put these individuals at increased risk
for harm. Johnson (2006) found that clients contributed to 30% of AEs found in his study of
Homecare AEs. Sears (2008) found that 52% of the AEs identified in Homecare charts were
related to the clients caring for themselves. Henriksen et al. (2009) discussed how human
factors can affect care and the ability of persons to provide care and vocalized concerns about
the fact that the health care system expects good results from elderly patients with comorbidities that include sensory, physical, and cognitive impairments.
Lang et al. (2008) have also discussed that competent older adults have the right to
personal choice and autonomy within their own private living environments, which may lead
to situations laden with risk, but private dwellings cannot be regulated to the extent that a
public hospital environment can. They also identified multiple dimensions of safety; not just
physical but also emotional, social, and functional safety. Safety in community care needs to
be individualized to each person. The autonomy and choice older adults and families have
within their own homes requires discussion between older adults and their caregivers on how
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to balance physical safety while maintaining an older adult’s dignity, sense of self, and
personal lifestyle choices (Lang & Edwards, 2006). This is demonstrated in the quote “safety
for her is maintaining her functionality and independence” (Lang & Edwards, 2006, p. 20).
Older adults and care providers do not have a shared understanding of ‘acceptable’ risk, and
this can create tensions between the older person attempting to maintain his/her freedom and
the various agencies who are attempting to ‘manage’ risk (Green & Sawyer, 2010).
The literature also provided evidence about supervision limitations resulting from
dynamically changing family structures, and increasing workloads of caregivers. The
Canadian Caregiver Coalition has reinforced, in its framework for a Canadian Caregiver
Strategy, that more women are in the workforce, which limits their time and availability for
caregiving, and that families are smaller and more geographically dispersed, which limits the
availability of assistance and opportunities to share the care between family members
(Canadian Caregiver Coalition, 2008). As well, home care work for caregivers is often
treated as though it should be straightforward and “accomplished naturally” (Purkis, Ceci, &
Bjornsdottir, 2011, p. 101). Purkis et al. (2011) described how challenging and complex it
was to determine how to care for older adults who are becoming frail. Lang et al. (2009)
reported how the emotional, physical, and social needs of the caregiver affect the care
provided. These authors also discussed the risk connected with incongruences between skill
and knowledge level of caregivers compared to the responsibility level given to caregivers. It
is clear from the literature that limitations in supervision increased the risk for older adults
requiring care.
The potential negative consequences that arise from a lack of communication,
incongruences in communication, fragmentation, and lack of collaboration were also well
documented. Masotti et al. (2009) identified that the first priority for formal providers to
diminish AEs was to improve communication of formal providers between agencies and
within agencies (i.e. nurse to therapist, nurse to nurse). Waugh (2009) reported that
partnerships between key services and care providers, both informal and formal, cooperating
and complementing each other is essential in providing quality care for those with dementia.
Johnson (2006) found that communication challenges between providers contributed to the
AEs identified in his study. Lang and Edwards (2006) also reported communication between

58

clients and care providers, as well as the communication between the multiple organizations
(i.e. Homecare, nursing, homemaking, PSW or therapy agencies) was a challenge linked to
safety in home care.
The benefits of an integrated care model are well known; as Chen and Thompson
(2010) explained “…it is pertinent to re-conceptualize the links between formal service use
and informal care based on the older adults’ characteristics and then to move towards an
integrated service system” (Chen & Thompson, 2010, p. 287). Integrated care programs are
used to decrease fragmentation of services and improve the continuity and coordination of
care (Wilhelmson et al., 2011). The cost effectiveness of home and community care can only
be seen within the context of a broader, integrated system of care (Hollander, Miller,
MacAdam, Chappell, & Pedlar, 2009). Integration of care was seen as a necessity for
supporting older adults, as stated by Carstairs and Koen (2009) in their report Canada’s
Aging Population: Seizing the Opportunity. Integrated care has the potential to improve
communication and decrease fragmentation of services, improving care and safety for older
adults.
The need for thorough fall risk assessment and strategies to address identified risks
has also been acknowledged in research. Speechley (2011) stated that a detailed fall risk
assessment and treatment of the modifiable risk factors was an important part of evidencebased strategies to prevent falls. Peel (2011) identified that “despite the availability of policy
and practice guidelines, there are still considerable challenges on many levels for integrating
best-practice falls prevention strategies” (p.15). Previous research has offered an abundance
of tools and education programs to help identify fall risks and to provide suggestions on how
to address these risks. The Canadian Falls Prevention Curriculum is a four week, on line
course detailing an evidence-based approach to the prevention of falls and fall-related
injuries, based on research by Vicky Scott (2007). Safer healthcare now! (2010) also
provides a kit for providers on how to reduce falls and injuries from falls. Although
available, these resources have not been fully implemented by those who care for older
adults.
Although the previously published literature provided an idea of ‘what’ happens to
put older adults at risk, it did not provide the entire picture. What this study uniquely
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contributes to the current body of knowledge is a series of detailed case study examples that
explain the greater system-wide contributors that link up, intersect, overlap, and sequentially
accumulate to result in an AE. With the use of case study methodology and a systemic
investigation, method this study provided not just the ‘what’, but also the ‘how’ and ‘why’ for
investigated fall occurrences.
Combining findings from eight case studies provided an insight into four themes of
commonalities, patterns, and shared characteristics between unrelated people and events.
Everyday living has become risky, not just because of multiple health issues and poor
personal choices that did not meet the best practice guidelines of formal care providers, but
often living has become risky because older adults are compensating and trying to make the
best of the situation and their abilities. Limitations with supervision contributed to missed
opportunities to mitigate deterioration and provide oversight for high risk individuals.
Caregiver availability limitations, interdependent elderly couples, and limited caregiving
involvement contributed to these missed opportunities. Influence at the supervision level was
limited by a caregiver’s resolve to avoid being paternalistic. Disconnects within the system
were caused by incomplete communication, which led to AEs. This study demonstrated how
poor communication can result in unrealistic expectations for recall, poor discharge planning,
and poor communication of service availability and options. These disconnects within the
system linked to Poor safety risk identification and follow-up. Multiple players in the formal
healthcare system, as well as policy makers within the general society, have not yet properly
identified potential safety risks or the consequences of their actions. For example, publicly
funded residences that were marketed to older adults were not being designed to meet the
long term needs of older adults with health issues. Making a place accessible and meeting
building code did not address safe occupational performance by older adults. When a task
cannot be completed safely due to fixed environmental features, an older adult will have to
make compromises. These adjustments and compromises bring us back full circle to the first
theme, that everyday living has become risky. These safety themes demonstrate how the
greater system-wide contributors link up, intersect, overlap, and eventually accumulate to
result in an AE.
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4.1 Review of Study Purpose and Objectives
The overall purpose of this study was to identify the factors that contributed to AEs in caredependent community-dwelling older adults and their caregivers with four specific
objectives. The following discussion reflects on completion of four specific objectives this
project has set to achieve.
The first objective was to conduct the case studies utilizing the SFIM to identify
specific safety deficiencies at the four levels of Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation
that contributed to AEs. This objective was achieved by conducting eight case studies that
identified over 240 different factors that contributed to the falls investigated in this study; 68
at the unsafe acts and decisions level, 101 at the preconditions level, 41 at the supervision
level and 37 at the organizational level.
The second study objective was to provide evidence on how the system-wide latent
factors combine with the actions of people at the sharp end to cause AEs in care-dependent
community dwelling older adults. The evidence from eight case studies demonstrated that
safety of older adults who age-in-place is a very complex issue. First, each sequence of
events showed the chronological linking of contributing factors. Second, every investigation
uncovered both sharp-end and latent contributing factors on all four layers of defenses,
symbolically described as holes in the Swiss Cheese. Shrinking or closing these holes will
improve safety not only for participants in this study but also for other older adults who for
example live in the same building, use the same wheelchair, or experience slow unsupervised
decline into cognitive impairment. The fewer and smaller the holes are, the stronger the
defenses are, creating a safer system. The content analysis also established interrelation
between themes and reinforced findings from Lau et al. (2007) that the “prevention of
adverse health events in the home and community requires recognizing the society as a
system, in which individuals are embedded in complex physical and social institutions that
can pre-dispose them to hazards” (p. 830).
The third objective was to identify safety themes from patterns and similarities across
multiple case studies. This objective was achieved by conducting content analysis, which
identified the four distinctly different overarching themes of Everyday living has become
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risky, Limitations with supervision, Disconnects within the system, and Poor risk
identification and follow-up.
The fourth and final objective was to discuss the implications of safety breakdowns
and direction for their improvements. The main repercussions for the safety breakdowns
found in this study were increased use of healthcare resources, increased pain, increased
stress for caregivers and care recipients, and decreased quality of life. Six of the eight
investigated events resulted in a visit to the hospital, with two individuals being admitted,
and one lady moving from the hospital to LTC. It is unlikely that caring for someone in
community will ever become comparable to an ultra-safe high reliability organization, such
as the aviation industry or a nuclear power plant, but the healthcare system and care at home
can become safer nonetheless. To make everyday living safer for care-dependent older
adults, they need knowledgeable and effective support systems that will satisfy their needs.
They also need effective communication between elements of the system, timely recognition
of safety risks, and serious proactive management of risks to prevent AEs from manifesting.
Going back to the words of Mrs. Bee “people [care recipients] are getting lost a little
bit…and that’s when the health care system gets costly, because it shouldn’t have happened
in the first place.” The people getting lost a little bit does not just apply to care-dependent
older adults and their caregivers who get ‘lost’ in the system’s service cracks, but also
family members, friends, agencies, health organizations, and policy makers who support and
cater to older adults. Changes at multiple levels of the system are needed to safely address
the needs of older adults.

4.2 Implications for Practice
There are numerous implications for practice that arose from this study. The will be
discussed here through five distinctive topics: the person level, the primary care level, the
Homecare level, the provider agency level, as well as the broader society level.
At the older person level, the most beneficial solutions are going to address the
personal choices made by older adults that lead to unsafe conditions. Solutions need to
ameliorate the poor choices that were driven by the strong desire to stay independent at all
costs and not accepting the functional changes that are occurring. The social norm to present
oneself in a positive light and not to be perceived as vulnerable prevented individuals from
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following up with fall prevention, because that was seen as admitting to being vulnerable
(Gopaul & Connelly, 2012). To maximize success, fall prevention messages need to align
with an older adult’s positive identity, since older adults do not see themselves as being at
risk (Dollard, Barton, Newbury, & Turnbull, 2012). Risky choices on the person level were
also made if the risk was deemed worthwhile, whether to prevent a move to LTC or to
maintain independence. These choices will be harder to ameliorate and will likely create
negative relationships if pressed. Each person has a lifelong history of being risky or
cautious. Unless the risky choice is going to affect the safety of another individual, one’s
right to autonomy cannot be taken away. Maladaptive choices also happened when an older
adult was making the best of the situation or in error, when the person thought a good choice
was being made. These choices were affected by factors out of the person’s control and could
only be solved by implementing changes further up in the system.
At the primary care level, which includes family physicians, pharmacists, and
specialists, solutions are needed to address the ineffectual supervision that was noted in the
investigated cases as well as the inadequate policies for safety of older persons. It was often
small things that added up to escalate in these falls, and it may only be small things that are
needed to de-escalate fall conditions for others in the future; for example arranging recall
visits for high fall risk individuals. To correct supervision limitations, primary caregivers are
recommended to critically evaluate what role they are currently taking to ensure an older
adult is in a safe situation and how that role be enhanced. Conducting a Failure Modes Effect
Analysis (FMEA) with a multi-disciplinary team may assist with this critical evaluation. It
“is a systematic, proactive method for evaluating a process to identify where and how
[practice process] might fail and to assess the relative impact of different failures, in order to
identify the parts of the process that are most in need of change” (Institute for Healthcare
Improvement, 2011, p. 1). This analysis needs to be followed with a critical review of what
role is practical to take in addressing the areas most in need of change in order to ensure an
older adult is in a safe situation and avoiding the potential AE (i.e., is it more practical to
recall high fall risk individuals bimonthly or twice yearly, what are the potential
consequences of either choice?). Inadequate policies were another issue at this primary care
level that can be addressed. Some issues identified in cases studies that should be addressed
are: written reminder, in addition to the verbal instructions, given by pharmacist with a
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medication change; need for a policy on recall process in the doctor office for those at high
risk of deterioration or cognitive decline; more patient education regarding pre-cataract
surgery to communicate the amount of assistance that will be needed after surgery and to
offer possible local options for acquiring this assistance.
At the formal Homecare level one of the most confounding contributing issues found
was related to the fact that home services that were meant to improve the life of older persons
did not match their lifestyle or needs. This mismatch contributed to the ‘firing’ of services
and increased the potential for an AE with the loss of formal oversight. It needs to be
acknowledged that this issue is shared with provider agencies as well, but PSW remuneration
is one latent factor that contributes to the agency’s difficulty with consistent scheduling and
consistent workers, especially for daily visit clients. PSWs in the community are paid a lower
wage than those who work in LTC, and due to travel time and down time between clients,
community PSWs need to work more hours for the same amount of paid time. These systemwide Homecare issues contribute to inconsistent visit times and multiple workers in one
home creating the mismatch between client need and services offered. Addressing PSW
remuneration may help solve this mismatch. Another issue at the formal Homecare level that
needs to be addressed is better communication with primary care, particularly when a person
with high risk of deterioration or cognitive decline has declined further Homecare service.
Sending a discharge summary to the family doctor will alert him/her that Homecare is no
longer overseeing the person and, thereby, allow the doctor to follow-up with the older adult
and provide oversight. These issues align with recommendations in a recently released report
from Ontario’s Senior Strategy, Living longer, living well (Sinha, 2013)
Implications for practice related to agencies include the following: therapy agencies,
public health units, and the Alzheimer’s society. The providers from these agencies can be
more effective in their role of improving the safety of seniors if they focus on effective
knowledge translation. This study found that ‘home safety’ and ‘fall prevention’ education
programs and messaging were not being heard by end users. Older adults and their caregivers
were also unaware of where to access and when to access support when physical or cognitive
declines occurred. Resources and solutions to improve the safety of seniors are available, but
these resources need to be evident and meaningful to the person meant to receive the
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message. A critical review of the effectiveness of education and messaging could ensure
optimal utilization of resources.
The last topic to address in implications for practice is that of the broader society.
Disjointed communication, inadequate physical environments, a diminished level of
supervision, and inadequate policies for care are some societal level issues that did not match
the needs of seniors in this study. The system as the whole would be more effective if a more
serious reflection on the needs of older adults was conducted. Family and friends require
greater awareness about the importance of and the need for thoughtful oversight, as indicated
in the previous paragraph. Other specific areas for improvement are the choice of public
housing and supportive care buildings that need better designs to meet the needs of older
adults. It can be recommended that when an environment is designated for seniors, the end
users should be consulted so the final product allows seniors with multiple health conditions
to complete their daily functional tasks. Older adults are a heterogeneous population group.
The majority of those over 65 years of age are very functional, but as they age-in-place,
many will eventually have health issues that require their physical environment to be more
accommodating in order to continue safe occupational/task performance. To meet the needs
of elderly who will age-in-place, in addition to universal accessibility criteria (i.e., for
entrances, doors, and halls), age-in-place design features need to be included (i.e., accessible
storage in the kitchen, grab bar installation in the bathrooms, easy to manage windows).
Addressing each of these small changes will translate into major improvements in the
overall safety of our elders. Further research can assist with optimizing solutions and
determining the cost-effectiveness of these sorts of preventative interventions.

4.3 Future Research
To find optimal solutions for increasing the safety of care-dependent older adults and their
caregivers, future research should take a closer look into why there is a seemingly casual
attitude in our society when it comes to the safety of older adults. Is this a result of poor
knowledge translation from research into community health care practice and society in
general, or a result of heavy workloads or caregiver demands, or some other factors? How
can informal overseers of older adults become more aware of the importance of their role and
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be more effective in their role? Further case study research investigating AEs with a focus on
where communication broke down, how it broke down, and why it broke down could provide
valuable information for improving ineffectual and incomplete communication. Further,
investigation into whether training health care professionals in motivational interviewing, in
conjunction with safety education sessions, would improve outcomes is warranted, to see if
supervision effectiveness could be improved. Research investigating solutions to address the
mismatch between Homecare services and client needs and lifestyles is also needed.
Investigating incidents that involve the ‘firing’ of services will provide insight into the issues
and possible solutions to address this important topic. Methodologically, further research
should examine if the recently published Incident Analysis Framework (Incident Analysis
Collaborating Parties, 2012) from the Canadian Patient Safety Institute is capable of
producing similar results in less time, while preserving the depth, comprehensiveness, and
descriptiveness of the SFIM.

4.4 Limitations to the Study
Although utmost care was exercised in completion of this study, several limitations
should be noted. The first is the possibility of selection bias, the tendency to only use those
parts of the data that support potential preconceived theories the researcher may have on the
topic (French et al., 2001). This is related to Stake’s (2005) concern that there is the risk in,
case studies methodology, for the researcher to pass along his/her meaning and interpretation
of the event and potentially miss other meanings as the story of the case is built. Use of the
tertiary participants in the SFIM workgroup decreased the risk of these potential biases, by
having multiple viewpoints analyzing each case. Writing the case summaries with detailed
descriptions allowed the researcher to make comparisons and construct new interpretations.
Each final report was revised by another researcher, adding to rigor.
The second limitation is that, as a retrospective investigative method, the SFIM relies
on recall from participants, and the risk for recall bias is ever present. Humans rarely think
about how they made decisions or what their mindset was at the time of an incident, and it
takes the efforts and skill of the investigator to ensure the depth of the story is achieved
through in-depth interviewing (Zecevic et al., 2007). The researcher is an experienced
occupational therapist familiar with interviewing older persons in their homes. The
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researcher was consistently mentored throughout this project by an experienced human
factors expert and SFIM investigator of seven years, to assure consistency and depth of detail
in the story across cases. However, because it is an art and science to complete an
investigation of any AE, it is possible that a different investigator, a different support team,
or an alternate expert mentor might have produced slightly different results.
The last limitation is related to the SFIM, the investigation tool used. Lundberg,
Rollenhagen and Hollnagel (2009) warn that different accident investigation models may
give priorities to different factors that contributed to the event. Some may focus more on
latent factors in the system; others may focus more on the sharp end, immediate factors
surrounding the incident. This can lead to omitting some aspects of an investigation that are
important in other investigative techniques. A number of other systemic investigation
methods/tools have been described in literature, such as the Canadian Root Cause Analysis
Framework (Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI), 2006), which has been updated to the
Integrated Analysis Framework (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012); the SystemOriented Event Analysis (SOEA) (Chuang, Pan, & Huang, 2009); the Systems-Theoretic
Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009); the
Integrated Procedure of Incident Cause Analysis (IPICA) (Ferjenik, 2011); and the
Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2012).

4.5 Utility of the SFIM
The SFIM was a valuable tool for identifying the contributing factors and separating
them into systemic levels. It was time consuming; on average, each case study took over 25
hours to investigate, consolidate, summarize the findings, and prepare the final report.
Building the sequence of events (SOE) was a thought provoking process that forced the
researcher and the SFIM workgroup to examine information from multiple sources and
generate new hypotheses as additional information became available, to ultimately make the
best possible sense of the emerging story. The SOE figure (available in the full SFIM reports
included in Appendices K-R) allows a person to chronologically follow how events build on
one another. One issue noted with the creation of the SOEs was the fact that duplication of
the same contributing factor was discouraged. This was done to avoid repetition in the Swiss
Cheese summary table. Hence, factors that might have repeatedly contributed to multiple
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safety significant events and potentially had more influence on the outcome were not
captured. One factor may have contributed to more than one safety significant event, but the
sequential nature of the SOE did not allow for cross connections to be made. This was a
concern for example, when the SOE was not able to link how one factor, such as cognitive
decline identified a month ago, also contributed to a safety significant event further on in
time. The summary and the within case analyses did allow for these connections to be made,
just not as concisely as a visual diagram.
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Chapter 5

5

Conclusions

Older adults require a comprehensive approach to their health care in order to safely remain
in their own homes and age in place. An intricate system of multiple players, on multiple
levels, influences care-dependent older adults and their caregivers. When the mechanisms
that are meant to protect the safety of older adults do not interact adequately, unnecessary
harm can result. Previous research identified factors that contributed to AEs based on
retrospective chart reviews and opinions of home healthcare experts. However, to enable a
more accurate and detailed identification of the contributing factors and how they link
together and affect one another to result in an AE, it was necessary to conduct a thorough
investigation; an investigation involving interviewing the affected individuals, their
significant others, and others who were directly or remotely involved. This investigation also
included examining the chronological sequence of events and the factors that contributed to
safety significant events on multiple levels within the system. The present study utilized the
SFIM to complete eight comprehensive case studies of falls in care-dependent older adults. It
provided an insight into how multiple components of the system linked and overlapped to
result in the falls. On average 35 (range 22-47) contributing factors were identified per
investigation. Many of the safety deficiencies were a result of small issues compounding
themselves and escalating over time, ultimately impairing a senior’s safety. Small things
matter when it comes to safety for older adults. Across-cases analysis identified four themes:
everyday living has become risky, supervision limitations, disconnects in the system, and
poor safety risk identification and follow-up. Findings show that while older adults were
completing normal everyday tasks, their decisions and acts combined with personal health
issues, environmental issues, and larger systemic issues and led to safety challenges beyond
their capacity to manage. Supervision of these older adults was limited and often ineffectual.
This contributed to more unsafe conditions that were not addressed and amelioration
opportunities that were lost. Disconnects in the system also resulted in lost opportunities to
prevent falls. This was primarily due to poor communication between components of the
healthcare system and offering services that did not match the needs of end user. Safety was
also impaired when safety risk identification was poor and follow-up from family, friends,
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and healthcare providers was lacking. With hindsight, it is possible to see the lost
opportunities for intervention, but with the foresight offered from these investigations, we
can reclaim these opportunities and improve safety for the growing demographic of older
adults, many of whom would prefer to age-in-place.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Adverse Event Definitions From the Literature

An adverse event has been defined in previously published literature in various ways:
•

“unintended injuries or complications resulting in disability at the time of discharge,
death, or prolonged hospital stay and that is caused by healthcare management rather
than by the patient’s underlying disease process” (Baker et al., 2004, p. 1679)

•

“any harm to the client that negatively affects their [sic] overall health and/or
functioning and is the result of care actions and/or inactions rather than the client’s
underlying condition” (Johnson, 2006, p. 128).

•

an “event or occurrence, which becomes apparent during the delivery of home care
services and which [sic] have a negative or potentially negative impact on: patient
outcomes, family or support care and resources utilization” (Masotti et al., 2007, p.
63)

•

“events which meet the following criteria: “(1) an unintentional injury or
complication (2) which results in disability, death or increase use of healthcare
resources (e.g. additional attendance by healthcare professionals, prolonged home
care stay, or hospitalization) and (3) is caused by health care management” (Sears,
2008, p. 67).

•

“unintended injury/complication that results in disability, death or increased use of
health care resources and is caused by health care management” (Doran et al., 2009,
p. 168)

•

The WHO would like to come to a common definition and utilizes “Patient safety
incident: an event or circumstance which could have resulted, or did result, in
unnecessary harm to a patient. Harmful incident (adverse event): an incident that
resulted in harm to a patient.” (Runciman, Hibbert, Thompson, VanderSchaat, &
Lewalle, 2009, p. 21) (Runciman, W., Hibbert, P., Thompson, R., VanderSchaat, T., & Lewalle, P.
(2009). Towards on international classification for patient safety: Key concepts and terms. International Journal
for Quality in Healthcare, 21(1), 18-26.)
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Appendix B: Comparison of Six Studies Examining Adverse Events in Health Care

Study
Baker et al. (2004)
Top AEs identified in a
random selection of 20
Canadian acute care
hospitals. Rates were based
on 3 745 patient charts
(excluding psychiatric and
obstetric cases).
Overall AE rate of 7.5%

Johnson (2006)
Based on a chart review of
400 randomly selected
Albertan home care clients in
2004 (all long term clients, no
palliative clients).
Overall AE rate of 5.5%

Madigan (2007)
AE rates based on the 2003
data base of over 3 million
Medicare clients. Categories
are derived from the Centre
for Medicare and Medicaid
Services’ outcomes-based
quality improvement
initiative.
Overall AE rate of 13.1%

Adverse event (AE) category/criteria
used for identification of AE
Unplanned admit before index admit
Unplanned readmission after
discharge from index admit
Adverse drug reaction
Hospital acquired infection/sepsis
Hospital incurred patient injury
Unexpected death
Unexplained transfer to another
acute care hospital
Unplanned transfer from general
care to ICU
Dissatisfaction reported in chart

Prevalence rate %
16.8
13.6
3.1
3.1
2.9
2.0
2.0
1.9
1.4

(Note: the list above were the criteria
used to identify patient charts with
potential AE, a breakdown of the actual
events found was not given)

(numbers relate to
percentage of
charts initially
identified with AE
criterion)

Injurious falls
Non injurious falls
Pressure ulcer
Adverse drug event
Mental harm/injury
Other (hospital admission, LTC
admission, unexpected death)

46.2
15.4
3.8
23.1
3.8
7.7
(percentages were
calculated from
cases with an AE)

Unexpected death
Unexpected admission to LTC
Emergency care for fall or accident at
home
Emergency care for wound infection
or deteriorating wound status
Emergency care for improper
medication administration or side
effect
Emergency care for hypo/
hyperglycemia
Development of urinary tract

5.1
1.8
3.3
2.6
0.9

0.9
5.7
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infection
Decline in oral medication
management
Increase in number of pressure
ulcers
Substantial decline in ≥3 ADLs
Discharge to community with
wound/medication management
requirements
Discharge to the community needing
toileting assistance
Discharge to the community with
problematic behaviours

21.4
1.3
0.4
59.7

14
4.8
(percentages were
calculated from
cases with an AE)

Masotti, Green, Shortt,
Hunter, & Szala-Meneck
(2007)
AE categories identified by a
group of 31 invitees with
experience and interest in
home health care (varying
from front line staff to
management and academic
researchers).

Sears (2008)
Based on chart review of 430
clients in south eastern
Ontario receiving RN and RPN
services, discharged in
2004/2005.
Overall AE rate of 13.2%

Doran, Hirdes, Blais, Baker,
Pickard, & Jantzi (2009)

Injury and falls to clients
Medication issues
Infections and wounds
Client abuse or neglect
Unexpected death or critical illness
or disability
Caregiver or client unit of support
system deterioration (i.e.,
caregiver burnout)

NA

Injurious falls
Adverse drug event
Pressure ulcer/skin breakdown
General decline
Delayed healing
Infection
Congestive heart failure
Catheter injury
Bowel impaction/obstruction
Bleed
Dehydration

24.6
16.4
11.5
11.5
9.8
8.2
6.6
4.9
3.3
1.6
1.6
(percentages were
calculated from
cases with an AE)

New fall
Unintended weight loss
New emergency room visit

11
10.4
8.3
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This study utilized the RAI-HC
data of 238 958 long term
home care clients (20032007), from Ontario, Nova
Scotia, and Winnipeg,
An overall AE rate was not
given

New hospital visit
Cognitive performance decline
New caregiver decline
New urinary tract infection
Pressure ulcer deterioration
New pressure ulcer
New pneumonia
New bowel problem
New dehydration

7.7
5.7
3.3
1.9
1.8
1.7
0.9
0.8
0.7
(percentages were
calculated based on
all reviewed charts,
some cases with
more than one AE)
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Appendix C: Western University Ethics Board Approval
pproval
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Appendix D: Page Given to Family Health Team to Facilitate Participant Recruitment
Sharp-end and blunt-end factors that contribute to adverse events in community home health
care

Identification of Eligible Participants
The following questions will help with identifying eligible caregiver/care receiver units for the
adverse events study.
 Does the individual speak English?
 Is the care receiver over the age of 65 years?
 Does the care receiver have live-in caregiver who provides care for at least 1 activity of daily
living (i.e., assistance, which can be physical-hands on, or verbal cueing, with bathing,
dressing, toileting, feeding, transfers, routine medication management)
 Was the individual involved in an incident that did have, or potentially could have had, a
negative impact on the person’s health and well-being, and was related to care received or
provided at home? Suitable events for this study would include:
a) falls (an unintended landing on a lower level)
b) injuries due to any cause
c) medication mismanagement
d) pressure ulcers
 Did this incident occur within the last week?
If yes to all questions, the individual is eligible to participate in the study.
Please ask the person if they are willing to have the researcher contact them for a face to face
interview.
Suggested wording may be:
“A research study about the reasons why accidents happen in community
health care is being completed. The researchers want to improve the safety for
older adults with health issues who remain in the community and have family
help take care of them at home. The study will involve the researcher coming to
your home and asking you some questions to investigate what lead up to your
experience. If you are interested, you will need to fill out this page with your
contact information and I will give you an information package. I will forward the
contact information to the researchers, and they will get back to you about
setting up an interview. You have the option of declining at any point if you
decide to agree.”
(Usually two interviews will be all that is required, and there may be 2-3 follow-up telephone calls to
clarify information. All the required data will be collected within two weeks of initial contact.)
If he/she agrees, please provide the information package (Letter of information [caregiver
and care receiver] and consent form) explaining the study more and have the contact information
form filled out. Please call Dorothy at 519-765-5051 with the individual’s name and number.
Feel free to call myself, Dorothy Gotzmeister, for any clarification (519) 765-5051. (Thank you!).
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ith Consent Page
Appendix E: Letter of Information-Caregiver and Care Receiver With

LETTER OF INFORMATION
(caregiver and care receiver)
Sharp-end and Blunt--end
end Factors that Contribute to Adverse Events in Community
Health Care
Principal Investigator:
Aleksandra Zecevic, PhD
Faculty of Health Sciences,
University of Western Ontario
azecevi2@uwo.ca
519-661-2111 x 80455
Co-Investigator:
Dorothy Gotzmeister MSc Candidate, OT Reg. (Ont.)
Health and Rehabilitation Sciences Graduate Program
University of Western Ontario
ddykstr2@uwo.ca
519-765-5051

You are invited to participate in a research study. This letter contains information to
help you decide whether or not to participate in this research project. It is important
for you to know why the data is being collected, why the research is being
conducted,
cted, and what we are asking you to agree to. Please take the time to read this
carefully and feel free to ask questions if anything is unclear.
This project will look at identifying what factors contribute to adverse events in health
care, specifically community home health care. This investigation is being completed
to better understand causes of adverse events and to improve the safety of
community care.
If you decide to participate, a researcher will interview you and any others involved,
to collectt detailed information about things that contributed to the adverse incident.
Interviews will be conducted in your home. Interviews and telephone calls will be
digitally recorded and the location of the event will be photographed. We are asking
for your permission
rmission to collect and use the information from your interview and your
health record for research purposes. All the information collected will be de-identified
de
(your name or identity will not be revealed) and will be entered into a Systemic
Adverse Eventss Investigative Method Database (Falls Database).
If you agree to participate, data relating to your health history and current care will
be reviewed and summarized
summarized.. Your case will be given a unique identifying code,
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and any personal information will be removed, i.e., your name, address,
telephone number. All information about your identity will be kept confidential.
All information from the interviews will be stored in a secure, locked room at the
University of Western, Ontario. Seven years after study completion all hard copies of
data will be destroyed. At the end of the study (approximately one year), any
digitally recorded interviews will be destroyed.
The information in the Falls Database will be identified only by a unique code
number. The Principal Investigator will keep the master list of codes in the Falls
Database in a secure location at the University of Western Ontario. The Falls
Database is managed by EmPower Health Research Inc. and is stored on a secured
web server. The data in the Falls Database will be retained indefinitely to allow us to
look at trends over time. The data might potentially be shared with other
researchers but it will not include any personal identifiers.
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, or refuse to
allow your data to go to the Falls Database, at any time-- with no effect on your
future care. If you wish to stop your participation just let the investigator know. The
consent to participate in the study will be retained at the University of Western
Ontario. You do not waive any legal rights by signing the consent form.
If the results of the research are published or presented at scientific meetings, your
name will not be used and no information that discloses your identity will be released
or published without your explicit consent.
You will not be compensated for your participation in this study.
There are no known risks to your participation in this study. All records and the
Database are secured and access is limited to authorized personnel. You will not
benefit directly from participation in this research; however the results of our study
may help minimize the risk of others in the community experiencing an adverse
event
Representatives of The University of Western Ontario Health Sciences Research
Ethics Board may contact you or require access to your study-related records to
monitor the conduct of the research. If you have any questions about the research or
the database you may contact Dr. Aleksandra Zecevic. She can be reached at 519661-2111 x80455. If you have any questions about your rights as a research
participant or the conduct of the study you may contact The Office of Research
Ethics at (519) 661-3036 or by email at ethics@uwo.ca.
This letter is for you to keep. You will also be given a copy of the consent form if you
agree to sign it.
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INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM for care giver and care receiver
(each need to sign their own copy)
Sharp-end and Blunt--end Factors that Contribute to Adverse Events in Community
Health Care
Principal Investigator:
Aleksandra Zecevic, PhD
Faculty of Health Sciences,
University of Western Ontario
azecevi2@uwo.ca
519-661-2111 x 80455
Co-Investigator:
Dorothy Gotzmeister MSc Candidate, OT Reg.

(Ont.)
Health and Rehabilitation Sciences Graduate Program
University of Western Ontario
ddykstr2@uwo.ca
519-765-5051

I have read the Letter of Information, have had the natur
nature
e of the study explained to
me, and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction.
______________________________________
Name of participant (Print)

______________________________________
Signature of participant

--------------------------Date

_______________________________________
Name of legally authorized representative (Print)
(If appropriate)

_______________________________________
Signature of legally authorized representative
(If appropriate)

--------------------------Date

_______________________________________
Name of person obtaining consent (Print)

________________________________________

---------------------------

Signature of person obtaining consent

Date
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Appendix F: Contact Information Form
Sharp-end and blunt-end factors that contribute to adverse events in community home health
care
ID Code:______
Completed by: _______________________________________________________
Contact Information
1. Name: ____________________________________________________

2. Gender (please circle):

Male

Female

3. Address:
Street number and name:________________________________________________
Apartment #: ______________________
City: _____________________________
Postal Code:_______________________
4. Home Phone Number: (

) ___________________________

5. Briefly describe the incident the study will examine:
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
____________

Please call Dorothy for pick-up of this page—519-765-5051.
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Appendix G: Mini Mental State Exam
Mini mental state exam (MMSE) (http://medicalimages.wordpress.com/#jp-carousel-727)
The mini mental is a standardized screening tool that will reveal if an individual may
have a mild (score 21-24), moderate (score 10-20), or severe (score less than 10) cognitive
impairment. It takes no more than 10 minutes to complete.
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Appendix H: Guidelines for Initial Investigation Interview

Questions for the caregiver and care receiver:
1. Can you please tell me a little bit about yourself (asked of both the care receiver and
caregiver)? Ask about age, diagnosis, physical limitations (general range of motion, strength),
functional abilities (speech, hearing, vision, mobility aids), medications.
2. a) How long have you been receiving care from ____________? OR
b) How long have you been providing care for_____________?
3. a) What types of care do you receive? OR
b) What types of care do you provide for ________________?
Can prompt about types of care (i.e., meals, shopping, cleaning, laundry, transportation,
and personal care-dressing, toileting, transfers, bathing, medication assistance).
4. Please describe for me the adverse event that happened in as much detail as possible. Have
the persons involved visit the site of the AE and recreate the situation.)
5. Would you further describe.....…probe for any further details required to complete the F-SHEL
data collection tool (see below).
6. Do you mind if I take some pictures of…....the area the event occurred, the equipment
involved, any injury sites?

Before completing the interview take the participant back through the steps they have described in
order to confirm the data. “Let me see if I’ve got it right. First you….then…and then…..”

Ensure that contact information is recorded for any other persons who will be contacted for further
follower up (i.e., neighbor, friend, health care workers).

Details required for F-SHEL data collection tool:

For this study ‘Faller’ will relate to the caregiver and care receiver who had the adverse event.

Table H1: Examples of interview topics for components of F-SHEL (Faller, Software, Hardware,
Environment, and Liveware) data collection tool for investigation of falls in seniors.
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F-SHEL
components

Interview topics

F – faller

Describes the faller: demographic information (age, gender, marital status, living
arrangement, and familiarity with immediate environment), recent adverse events (death
of a friend or family member), medical and history of falling, medications currently used,
acute pain, recent hospitalizations, ability to perform activities of daily living, stress
(domestic, financial, bereavement), fatigue, sleep, attention and memory, perception,
decision making, attitudes, fear of falling, balance, physical activities, alcohol
consumption, and other known internal risk factors for falling.

L – liveware

Enquires about human to human interactions at the scene of the incident as well as in
the life of the faller: verbal communication at the time of the event, language barrier,
body language and non-verbal clues, interaction with others, cultural differences, group
influences, cooperation, attitudes, anxiety, behavior, apprehension, family and social
network, supervision and monitoring, decision making, safety and risk management,
commitment and involvement of family and the social network, real and perceived
pressures, habits, etc.

E – environment

Includes: (a) internal environment or conditions in which people live like lighting, room
temperature, floor condition, noise, vibration; and (b) external environment like weather,
elements, infrastructure (sidewalks, bus stops, unmarked inclinations), geographic
particularities, seasonal changes, maintenance of facilities and equipment, etc.

H – hardware

Explores equipment utilized by the faller or present at the scene. If applicable the
following factors can be investigated in detail: use of a assistive device (design,
reliability and safety), stairs or ladders, footwear (comfort, design), shopping carts,
physical space, arrangement of hardware, display and auditory considerations, etc.

S – software

Includes any written information such as regulatory requirements (e.g., bathroom grab
bars, raised toilet seats), manuals, service bulletins, knowledge and training information
(e.g., assistive devices), automation, equipment licenses (e.g., regulation of safety
requirements for imported devices), medical information (e.g., expiring dates on
medications), etc.

(Zecevic, Salmoni, Lewko, & Vandervoort, 2007)
Note: This is not an extensive list of questions but rather a guide.
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Appendix I: Letter of Information-Generic and Consent Page
P
LETTER OF INFORMATION – Generic
(anyone except the care giver and care receiver, who were directly involved in the
adverse event)
Sharp-end and Blunt--end
end Factors that Contribute to Adverse Events in Community
Health Care
Principal Investigator:
Aleksandra Zecevic, PhD
Faculty of Health Sciences,
University of Western Ontario
azecevi2@uwo.ca
519-661-2111 x 80455
Co-Investigator:
Dorothy Gotzmeister, MSc candidate, OT Reg. (Ont.)
Health and Rehabilitation Sciences Graduate Program
University of Western Ontario
ddykstr2@uwo.ca
519-765-5051

This letter contains information to help you decide whether or not to participate in
this research project. It is important for you to know why the data is being collected,
why the
he research is being conducted and what we are asking you to agree to.
Please take time to read this carefully and feel free to ask questions if anything is
unclear.
Recently_________________, experienced an injury, or close call that could have
resulted in an injury. An investigator trained in the Systemic Adverse Events
Investigative Method has been assigned to investigate this adverse event. The
investigator would like to interview you to co
collect
llect detailed information about things
that contributed to the event. Interviews will be audio recorded and the location of
the adverse event will be photographed. The information collected will be dede
identified (your name or identity will not be revealed
revealed)) and entered into a Systemic
Adverse Events Investigative Method Database (Falls Database). We are asking for
your permission to collect and use the information from your interview for research
purposes. This investigation is done to better understand cau
causes
ses of adverse events
in the community and improve the safety of community care.
If you agree to participate, data you provide will be reviewed and summarized. Any
identifying features, such as name, address or telephone number, will be
removed, and a unique
ique identifier number will be used
used.. All data (with personal
identifiers removed) is kept confidential and stored at a secure location at the
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University of Western Ontario for up to seven years. Any digitally recorded
interviews will be destroyed after the study is complete.
Adverse events will be included in the Falls Database, where it will be identified only
by a unique code number. The Principal Investigator will keep the master list of
codes in the Falls Database in a secure location at the University of Western
Ontario. The Falls Database is managed by EmPower Health Research Inc. and is
stored on a secured web server. The data in the Falls Database will be retained
indefinitely to allow us to look at trends over time. The data may potentially be
shared with other researchers but it will not include any personal identifiers.
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, or refuse to
allow data to go to the Falls Database at any time. If you wish to stop your
participation just let the investigator know. The consent to participate in the study will
be retained at the University of Western Ontario.
Your decision to participate will not influence your relationship with the individual
who experienced the adverse event. You do not waive any legal rights by signing the
consent form.
If the results of the research are published or presented at scientific meetings, your
name will not be used and no information that discloses your identity will be released
or published without your explicit consent.
You will not be compensated for your contribution to this study.
There are no known risks to your participation in this study. All records and the Falls
Database are secured and access is limited to only authorized personnel. You will
not benefit directly from participation in this research however the results of this
research may help minimize the risk of adverse events occurring to others in
community care.
Representatives of The University of Western Ontario Health Sciences Research
Ethics Board may contact you or require access to your study-related records to
monitor the conduct of the research. If you have any questions about the research or
the database you may contact Dr. Aleksandra Zecevic. She can be reached at 519661-2111 x80455. If you have any questions about your rights as a research
participant or the conduct of the study you may contact The Office of Research
Ethics at (519) 661-3036 or by email at ethics@uwo.ca.
This letter is for you to keep. You will also be given a copy of the consent form if you
agree to sign it.
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Interview CONSENT FORM – Generic
Sharp-end and Blunt--end
end Factors that Contribute to Adverse Events in Community
Health Care
Principal Investigator:
Aleksandra Zecevic, PhD
Faculty of Health Sciences,
University of Western Ontario
azecevi2@uwo.ca
519-661-2111 x 80455
Co-Investigator:
Dorothy Gotzmeister, MSc candidate, OT Reg. (Ont.)
Health and Rehabilitation Sciences Graduate Program
University of Western Ontario
ddykstr2@uwo.ca
519-765-5051

I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to
me, and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction.

-------------------------------------------------------------Name of participant (Print)

-------------------------------------------------------------Signature of participant

--------------------------Date

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Name of person obtaining consent (Print)

-------------------------------------------------------------Signature of person obtaining consent

--------------------------Date
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Appendix J: Guidelines for Investigative Interview With ‘Others’

1. My name is ______________.I am a health and science student the health and rehabilitation
graduate program at the University of Western Ontario. I am doing a study on safety in home
care. Mr. and Mrs. _______________are participating and have told me about their recent
____________ (the AE), and I was hoping that you had 5-10 minutes to clarify for me details
about ___________. (probe for details to about the sequence of events, and if applicable
about policies and procedures related to the AE, best practices related to the AE, supervision
levels at the time, personalities, cooperation, education given)
2. Is there anything else you would like to share with me about __________ (the AE)?
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Appendix K: Mr. Dee Full SFIM Report
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Sequence of Events: 14801

14801 1/3
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14801 2/3
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14801 3/3
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Appendix L: Mrs. Kay1 Full SFIM Report
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Sequence of Events: 15522

15522 1/5
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15522 3/5
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15522 4/5
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15522 5/5
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Appendix M: Mrs. Kay2 Full SFIM Report
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Sequence of Events: 15523

15523 1/3
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15523 2/3
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15523 3/3
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Appendix N: Mrs. Bridge full SFIM report
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Sequence of Events: 15524
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Appendix O: Mrs. Broom Full SFIM Report
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Appendix P: Mrs. Peters Full SFIM Report
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Sequence of Events: 16036

16036 1/2
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16036 2/2
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Appendix Q: Mrs. Rose Full SFIM Report
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Sequence of Events: 16259
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16259 3/3
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Appendix R: Mrs. Bee Full SFIM Report
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Sequence of Events: 16383
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Appendix S: Description of Codes Used to Identify Patterns and Similarities Among Factors
that Contributed to Falls in Older Adults
Link to
final
themes

Code

Sub-codes

Description

1. Maladaptive
Choices

A: wanting to stay
independent

A potentially inappropriate choice made with the
intention/desire to keep ones independence; not
wanting to accept functional changes that are
occurring as one ages.

B: choosing to accept
personal risk

A potentially inappropriate choice related to
personal preference is made in disregard to known
risks; personal preference supersedes potential
risk; the risk is judged to be worthwhile.

C: making the best of it

A potentially inappropriate choice is made to
compensate for something that is felt to be
unchangeable or to accommodate other choices
made.

D: thinking they were
doing the right thing

A potentially inappropriate choice made with the
intention of doing the right thing, unaware of the
potential risky consequence of the choice.

A: body functions and
body structures

Includes disease (acute or chronic), disorder,
injury, trauma; physical and/or cognitive
limitations resulting from impairments in body
function or body structure.

B: interpersonal/
intrapersonal
interactions

Includes any interpersonal relationships issues;
personalities.

C: pharmaceutical
matters

Includes medication errors, events, and
polypharmacy.

A: fixed/predetermined
human-made physical
factors

Related to structural issues that are not easy to
change without construction.

1

B: adaptable/
changeable humanmade physical factors

Related to the set-up of the environment and the
items in it.

4

C: natural world factors

Related to physical factors beyond control of
humans.

D: product and
technology factors

Related to equipment and technology used.

A: supportive housing

Relates to the physical features and design features
that are inadequate for meeting the needs of adults
with health issues, within a building designated as
a supportive housing environment for older
persons.

B: building codes for
public senior housing

Relates to lack of consideration for mandatory
fixed physical design features to meet the needs of
adults with health issues in public residences
geared and marketed for older persons.

2. Faller’s personal
factors

3. Faller’s physical
environmental
factors

4. Inadequate
policies for safety of
older persons (laissez
faire attitude of
society)

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

4

4
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5. Limitations in the
availability of
supervision

6. Ineffectual
supervision

7. Incomplete
communication

C: identification of a
person with cognitive
decline and no caregiver

Relates to lack of policy and lack of an appropriate
system to keep track of high risk individuals.

D: additional policy
topics

Relates to additional inadequate policy topics such
as those related to home health safety aids and
patient medical files.

A: formal service
providers

This relates to workload and scheduling issues;
high workload affects interaction with care
recipients, scheduling affects how a worker is able
to meet a client’s needs.

B: no children and no
spouse

Older person has no one stepping up to be the “go
to” person, to accept responsibility for overseeing
regular life issues.

C: family caregivers

Caregiver has multiple priorities; or family do not
live close by and are therefore unavailable to
provide regular supervision or assistance.

D: interdependence with
aging spouse

Married couples can be reliant on one another, and
both have physical factors that limit functioning.

A: yielding

Giving in to the older person’s choice even though
it may not be in the best interest of this person
(i.e., inability to persuade an individual to followup with best practices); avoiding being
paternalistic.

B: minimal level of
involvement

Only doing the basics required, not taking the
extra step to be more critical.

A: resulting from
unrealistic expectations
for recall

Instructions are given but not written out, or given
when emotions are high or when lots of
information has been given; can lead to not
following-up, forgetting to follow-up.

B: resulting from being
uninformed,
undiagnosed, or the
information is
unavailable at time
needed

Communication is lacking because an issue is
undiagnosed, the information is not available, the
required information is stored with another
provider and not quickly accessible when required,
or information is not communicated or passed on.

C: resulting from poor
discharge, poor care
transition

An individual is discharged or care is transferred
without a sufficient plan for ensuring that a high
risk individual is supervised by the system.

D: resulting from
information that is
required to ameliorate
the situation not being
readily evident, poor
knowledge translation

Messages or programs for older persons do not
reach them or are not well-known about with the
result that the information needed is not evident to
the individual at that moment.

8. Home services that
did not match the
lifestyle of the older
person

Services that are meant to improve the lives of
older persons, end up disrupting their lives; related
to the lack of flexibility and highly structured
supports provided by CCAC.

9. Doing everyday

This relates to factors that are actions or activities
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things

that the general public would not have an issue
with completing; all participants were just
completing everyday routines.

10. Other

Items that had incomplete information regarding
the intention of the act and therefore could not be
coded; actions that were non voluntary or
automatic in nature; not a conscious decision.
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